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Overarching Abstract 
Developing young people’s character is believed to promote their wellbeing, helping 
them to weigh competing priorities in complex situations and act in ways which 
uphold the interests of themselves and others. There is currently disagreement about 
the theoretical underpinnings of Character Education and the best way to support 
young people to develop their character. This thesis aims to explore these issues in 
more detail.  
Chapter 1  
This chapter reports on a systematic literature review, synthesising six papers. It 
explores Character Education programmes, outlining their theoretical underpinnings 
and reporting their effects on participants’ moral virtues and practical wisdom. The 
majority of interventions were based on mixed theoretical underpinnings but 
commonly cited trait theories of virtue. Four studies demonstrated improvement in 
some aspects of moral virtue as a result of Character Education interventions.  
Chapter 2  
This chapter is a bridging document which links Chapters 1 and 3. It outlines the 
reasons for choosing Character Education as a topic of study and discusses key 
considerations informing the design of the empirical research, including philosophical 
stance, methodology and ethics.  
Chapter 3  
This chapter reports on an empirical research project which involved 18 secondary 
school students discussing the process they undergo when making moral decisions. 
It provides a qualitative exploration of how participants’ personal beliefs about the 
meaning of good character interact with situational factors to influence their moral 
decision-making. Findings suggest that young people’s moral decision-making is 
influenced by a range of situational factors which are integrated to produce the best 
possible outcome for self and others. Implications for the design of Character 
Education programmes and the potential role of educational psychologists in 
supporting this are explored in more detail.  
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Chapter 1. Systematic Literature Review 
Abstract 
There has been a resurgence in the popularity of Character Education in recent 
years. The development of moral virtues and practical wisdom is said to promote 
good character and has been linked to wellbeing. A systematic review of existing 
research investigated the effects of Character Education interventions on the moral 
virtues and practical wisdom of adolescents. Given the current diversity in the 
theoretical underpinnings of existing Character Education programmes, the review 
also explored the psychological theories underpinning each intervention in more 
detail. Petticrew and Roberts’ systemic review procedure was followed. Six studies 
were identified for in-depth review. Study quality was assessed using the EPPI-
centre Weight of Evidence tool. The review found the theoretical underpinnings, aims 
and outcome measures employed in each study were diverse. Four studies found a 
significant effect of Character Education intervention on knowledge and 
understanding or enactment of at least one moral virtue. The findings indicate that 
Service Learning and literacy-based intervention programmes seemed to have the 
most promising impact on the development of moral virtues. No studies explicitly 
investigated practical wisdom. The possible implications of these findings for the 
development of Character Education theory and practice are discussed, along with 
areas for future research. 
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What are the effects of Character Education on the moral virtue and practical 
wisdom of young people? 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Character and wellbeing 
Character Education (CE) is a form of Moral Education (ME) with its origins in 
Aristotelian thinking (Arthur, Kristjánsson, Harrison, Sanderse, & Wright, 2017). It has 
had a resurgence in popularity in recent years as a result of the virtue ethics 
movement in philosophy (Curren, 2010). CE is set apart from other forms of ME by its 
focus on living well, rather than acting out of moral duty and obligation (Althof & 
Berkowitz, 2006). Developing good character to promote wellbeing is increasingly 
seen as an aim of CE in both the USA and the UK (Clement & Bollinger, 2017; 
Department for Education, 2017; Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2017; 
Walker, Roberts, & Kristjánsson, 2015) and character development has recently 
been added to England’s Ofsted inspection framework (Ofsted, 2019).  
1.1.2 Origins of Character Education 
CE originates with Aristotle (2009). He argued the way to achieve wellbeing, or 
‘Eudaimonia’, is to develop one’s character. Character is conceived of as a 
disposition to uphold moral excellences known as virtues. Virtues are dispositions 
that make someone a good person and enable them to perform their uniquely human 
function of pro-sociality well (Fowers, 2012a). These virtuous habits require unity of 
thought, feeling and action (Malin, Liauw, & Damon, 2017) and lie in a ‘mean’ 
between excess and deficiency (Aristotle, 2009, Bk II, p. 6) which will be different 
according to the individual and the situation. Therefore, Aristotle highlighted the 
importance of developing the ability to reason about these habits and to act in 
rational and logical ways according to the demands of the situation. He called this 
‘practical wisdom’ (Aristotle, 2009, Bk VI, p. 5), defined as the ability to deliberate 
well about what constitutes a good life. Practical wisdom is said to entail integrating 
the demands of competing virtues and choosing the best course of action (JCCV, 
Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2017). Virtue can only be said to be fully 
developed when combined with practical wisdom (Kraut, 2018). 
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1.1.3 Towards a psychological theory of character 
Despite CE’s growing popularity, there is currently no unified psychological or 
educational theory to guide schools’ practice (Curren, 2016; Kristjánsson, 2017; R. 
White & Shin, 2017). Many empirical studies are criticised for not defining the 
boundaries between CE and related terms such as Moral Education, Values 
Education and Social and Emotional Learning (Berkowitz & Bier, 2014). Some CE 
programmes have adopted Berkowitz & Bier’s (2004, p. 73) definition of character as 
a ‘complex set of psychological characteristics that enable an individual to act as a 
moral agent’. This is a broad definition which has been judged to incorporate a wide 
range of interventions, as evidenced in Berkowitz and Bier’s (2007) meta-analysis 
detailing what works in CE. Studies in this review include neo-Kohlbergian cognitive 
theories of stages of moral reasoning, which have traditionally been more associated 
with ME than CE and focus on the importance of reason. Such disparate approaches 
have made it difficult to pinpoint what is meant by the term ‘Character Education’ 
(Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006).  
In contrast, CE programmes in the UK such as ‘Knightly Virtues’ (Arthur, Harrison, 
Carr, Kristjánsson, & Davison, 2014) and ‘My Character’ (Arthur, Harrison, 
Kristjánsson, & Davison, 2014) have adopted a neo-Aristotelian approach that 
conceptualises virtues as character strengths. This conceptualisation comes from the 
Positive Psychology movement and has been hailed as providing an empirical 
account of virtue (Sanderse, 2015). Peterson and Seligman (2004) outlined twenty-
four character strengths they found across all cultures studied in their Values in 
Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA). These were then combined into six ubiquitous 
virtues: courage, justice, humanity, temperance, transcendence and wisdom. They 
claimed the VIA can be used to uncover the character traits that individuals possess.  
Subsequent factor analysis studies (McGrath & Walker, 2016; Shryack, Steger, 
Krueger, & Kallie, 2010) have called into question the universality of the strengths 
and virtues in the VIA. It seems that if a set of universal virtues exist there is little 
agreement as to what these might be. A further criticism of trait theories of virtue 
concerns the variation in virtuous behaviour observed across situations in several 
studies (Doris, 2002; Szutta, 2012). A range of experiments from social psychology 
have demonstrated how subtle changes in situational variables can have a significant 
impact on whether participants act morally or not (Hartshorne, May, Maller, & 
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Shuttleworth, 1928; Hasegawa, 2016; Isen & Levin, 1972; Milgram, 1974; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). This renders trait theories of character and their 
measurement problematic and reinforces Aristotle’s (2009) argument that acting 
virtuously does not entail simply learning a set of virtuous behaviours and applying 
them indiscriminately; one must also develop the practical wisdom to respond 
appropriately to a situation.  
Although practical wisdom constitutes a key component of Aristotelian Character 
Education, some argue that practical wisdom is complex and is not a set of skills or 
procedures that can be operationalised (Lapsley, 2016). Despite this, the JCCV 
(2017) argue it is not possible to have character without practical wisdom, which they 
define as ‘the capacity to choose intelligently between alternatives’ (p. 2). The JCCV 
suggests that virtue literacy (knowledge and understanding of the virtues) and virtue 
reasoning (the ability to reason about the virtues) would constitute important 
components of measurable practical wisdom. Another important feature of practical 
wisdom lies in applying virtues in a way that is responsive to the situation (Bessant, 
2009; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014). This has led some psychologists to turn their 
attention to the interaction between person and situation. 
Lerner and Callina (2014) emphasise the importance of person-context interactions 
in understanding character. According to their theory of character development, 
which is based on Relational Developmental Systems (RDS) theory (Overton, 2015), 
it does not make sense to speak of virtue in isolation from context. Virtue entails 
responding flexibly to the situation at hand, rather than responding in the same way 
to all situations. RDS theories of character therefore stress that any definition of 
character should be framed in terms of coherence in the application of virtues across 
situations, rather than consistency (Nucci, 2017).  
Clearly, there is a diverse range of theories about the empirical nature of virtue and 
practical wisdom. Psychological theories of virtue include: the psychological skills 
underpinning moral behaviour (Berkowitz & Bier, 2004), the cognitive skills 
underpinning moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984), a combination of character strengths 
coupled with practical wisdom (Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2017), or 
the ability to make coherent judgements incorporating an understanding of virtue with 
the demands of a situation (Lerner & Callina, 2014). There is still much empirical 
work to be done in developing a coherent understanding of the psychological 
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underpinnings of character in order to inform CE programmes (Curren, 2016; 
Kristjánsson, 2017).  
1.1.4 Assessing the impact of Character Education programmes 
US-based studies into the effects of CE interventions have adopted a broad definition 
of character and a diverse range of outcomes including social and emotional literacy, 
drug use, behaviour, school attendance and academic attainment (Berkowitz & Bier, 
2004; Berkowitz, Bier, & McCauley, 2016; Lickona & Davidson, 2005). Kristjánsson 
(2015) argues research is needed which focuses specifically on understanding how 
interventions work to promote wellbeing through the development of virtues. 
Similarly, the JCCV (2017) argue that CE should focus on the development of other-
focused moral virtues and practical wisdom. This formed the focus of the current 
review. 
1.1.5 Aims of the current review 
Given the variety of theoretical approaches to CE and the diverse range of 
psychological conceptualisations of virtue and practical wisdom, the aim of the review 
was both to explore the theoretical underpinnings of CE programmes and to 
investigate their effects on moral virtue and practical wisdom. The focus on character 
and virtue as the intrinsic aims of CE reflects the growing focus on wellbeing as an 
important aim of education in the UK (Walker et al., 2015). Developing an integrated 
understanding of current CE approaches could help to inform future directions for 
study.  
Adolescents were selected as the target population for the review because 
adolescence has been highlighted as an important period in moral development 
(Lickona, 2014; Walker, Thoma, Jones, & Kristjánsson, 2017) and because 61% of 
secondary school teachers surveyed believed more explicit moral education was 
needed in schools (Arthur, Kristjánsson, Walker, Jones, & Sanderse, 2015).  
 
The review question comprised two parts. The first focused on how character and 
virtues were conceptualised by CE programmes and the second focused on the 
effects of CE interventions on participants’ moral virtues and practical wisdom.  
Review questions:  
a) How are character and virtues defined within CE programmes? 
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b) What are the effects of the direct teaching of CE on the moral virtue and 
practical wisdom of adolescents? 
1.2 Method 
Petticrew & Roberts’ (2006) systematic review stages were combined with 
components of the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) checklist (Liberati et al., 2009). This meets the Methodological 
Expectations of Cochrane Intervention Reviews (2013) and helped structure each 
stage of the review. Table 1 shows how PRISMA items were incorporated into the 
review process.  
1.2.1 Defining the review question 
Scoping searches were undertaken between July 2017 and November 2017. As 
discussed in the introduction, CE was identified as the area of interest. The effect of 
CE on moral virtue and practical wisdom was selected as the focus.  
Table 1 Systematic review and PRISMA checklist  
Systematic review stages (Petticrew & 
Roberts, 2006) 
 
Items taken from PRISMA 
checklist (Liberati et al., 2009) 
1. Clearly define the question that the review is 
setting out to answer. 
 
2. Determine the types of studies that need to 
be located in order to answer your question. 
Eligibility criteria 
3. Carry out a comprehensive literature search 
to locate these studies. 
Information sources; Search 
4. Screen the studies found, using inclusion 
criteria to identify studies for in-depth review 
Study selection 
 
5. Describe the included studies to ‘map’ the 
field, and critically appraise them for quality 
and relevance. 
Data collection process; Data 
items; Risk of bias in individual 
studies 
6. Synthesise studies’ findings. Summary measures; Synthesis 
of results; Risk of bias across 
studies; Additional analysis 
7. Communicate outcomes of the review.  
 
1.2.2 Locating studies 
Eligibility Criteria 
The population of interest was adolescents, defined as young people aged between 
13 and 18. Only studies using the term “Character Education” and employing direct 
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teaching were included. The outcomes of these studies had to relate to moral virtue 
or practical wisdom. Studies published from 2007 onwards were included. No limits 
were applied for language or country. 
1.2.3 Literature search 
Information sources  
Electronic databases were searched between November and December 2017 on 
PsycInfo (Ovid), British Education Index (BEI, EBSCO), Scopus; and Educational 
Resource Index and Abstracts (ERIC, EBSCO). Search terms were created for ERIC 
(shown below in Table 2). These were then adapted according to each electronic 
database’s Controlled Vocabulary or Thesaurus (see Appendix A). Electronic 
database searching yielded 178 papers.  
Table 2 Electronic database search terms  
Character education Adolescent Practical wisdom/moral 
virtue 
“Character education” DE1 “adolescents” 
DE “Middle school 
students” 
DE “Early adolescents” 
DE “High school students” 
DE “Junior high school 
students” 
DE “Secondary school 
students” 
DE “Moral development” 
DE “Moral values” 
Virtue* 
 “Practical wisdom” 
Moral reasoning 
Moral judgement 
Character  
Phronesis 
Reference lists of the most relevant papers were hand-searched by title and key 
words to check for relevant publications, yielding three papers.  
Publications from the JCCV were hand-searched. This yielded one paper. The 
Journal of Research in Character Education was also hand-searched from 2007 (Vol. 
5(2)) to the latest available publication in 2017 (Vol. 13(1)). This yielded two papers. 
Newcastle University’s electronic library catalogue was searched for grey literature. 
Relevant titles were selected for further screening. This yielded four papers. An 
advanced search of government documents on Google yielded one paper. The total 
number of papers after the initial search was 189. Duplicates were removed, leaving 
166 papers for further screening.  
 
                                                          
1 DE denotes words or phrases searched using database Thesaurus. 
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1.2.4 Screening 
Study selection 
166 papers were screened by title, abstract and key words according to inclusion 
criteria as shown in Table 3: 
Table 3 Study selection inclusion criteria 
Criteria Description 
Population Adolescents (ages 13-18) were the target population. However, 
studies with a mix of age-groups including but not limited to the 
target population were retained. 
Intervention Only interventions called “Character Education” (not ‘Moral 
Education’ or ‘Values Education’) and entailing direct teaching 
related to moral virtue or practical wisdom were selected. No limits 
were placed on the length of the intervention. 
Comparison Studies both with and without a control or comparison group were 
included due to the difficulty in separating some populations of 
students from others within and between school settings. 
Outcomes Only studies listing outcomes relating to moral virtue or practical 
wisdom were selected. 
Setting Interventions all took place in educational establishments. 
The number of records excluded following screening was 139, leaving 27 articles. 
These articles were read in full and the eligibility and inclusion criteria applied. Six 
studies were taken forward for in-depth review. The process of study selection is 
outlined in Figure 1. 
1.2.5 Describing and appraising studies 
Data collection  
The remaining six studies were analysed according to their aims, participants, 
setting, design, theoretical underpinnings, intervention, outcome measures and 
findings (See Table 4). Some studies used mixed methods. However, there was not 
enough qualitative data relevant to the review question to perform in-depth qualitative 
analysis. Relevant qualitative findings were analysed alongside quantitative 
measures.  
Weighing the quality of evidence 
Studies included in the in-depth review were analysed in detail using the EPPI-
Centre Weight of Evidence tool (2007) (See Appendix B). This analysis informed 
judgments of the weight of evidence of each study using Gough’s (2007) Weight of 
Evidence criteria (See Table 5).  
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Figure 1 Study Selection Flow Diagram  
(adapted from Liberati et al., 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.6 Synthesising Findings 
Findings of the studies were synthesised by comparing the theoretical bases of their 
approach, aims, study designs, outcome measures and the weight of evidence 
judgments given to each. Based on this, decisions were made about the strength of 
evidence put forward in each study. From this, suggestions were made about 
implications for future research.  
Records identified through 
database searching = 178 
  
Additional records 
identified through other 
sources = 11 
  
Records after duplicates 
removed = 166 
  
Records screened = 166 
  
Records excluded = 139 
  
Full-text articles assessed 
for  
Eligibility = 27 
Full-text articles excluded = 
21 
Studies included in 
quantitative synthesis = 6 
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Table 4 Characteristics of in-depth review studies 
Study  Aims Participants 
& Setting 
Design Theoretical 
basis 
Intervention Outcome 
Measures 
Findings  
(* = significance or effect size not reported 
due to insufficient data) 
Arthur, 
Harrison, 
Burn, and 
Moller 
(2017) 
To explore 
how schools 
implement 
CE and to 
explore how 
effective 
teachers and 
pupils 
believe CE 
progs. have 
been. 
Teaching staff 
(n = 20) 
Primary (Y6) 
and 
secondary 
(Y8 and Y13) 
school pupils 
(n= 459). 
 
Birmingham 
UK. 
2 secondary 
schools; one 
primary. 
Case 
study – 
mixed 
methods. 
Aristotelian 
Virtue Ethics. 
Character = set 
of personal 
traits that 
inform 
motivation and 
guide conduct. 
Goal of CE = 
development of 
virtue and 
practical 
wisdom. 
 
Year-long 
taught CE 
programme 
based on the 
JCCV 
Framework for 
Character 
Education in 
Schools 
(2013), varied 
according to 
setting.  
Quantitative 
Moral judgment 
scores on Ad-
ICM to assess 
virtue 
reasoning.  
 
Moral self-
relevance 
measure. 
 
Qualitative 
Discussion 
included details 
about impact of 
CE on 
students. 
Quantitative 
Mean Ad-ICM scores*: Secondary school 1: 
49%; Secondary school 2: 52%  
(Comparison from previous study of Y10 
pupils = 43%) 
Moral self-relevance: Moral virtues identified 
as more important than performance virtues. 
Top 3 virtues in both secondary schools: 
respect, responsibility and gratitude. 
 
Qualitative 
Students use/understand language of virtue. 
Pupils appreciate how virtues pertain to their 
own lives and can spot application in lessons. 
Virtue awareness does not always translate 
into behaviour. 
 
Billig, Jesse, 
and Grimley 
(2008) 
To find the 
effect of a 
Service 
Learning 
approach to 
CE on 
students’ 
character. 
568 middle 
school and 
427 high 
school 
students (840 
participants; 
155 controls). 
Mean age: 
14.2 years. 
38 teachers in 
15 schools. 
Philadelphia, 
USA. 
15 middle and 
high schools. 
Quasi-
exptl: 
schools 
following 
Service-
Learning 
CE = 
matched 
with 
control 
schools. 
Unclear. 
Character = 
disposition to 
enact prosocial 
behaviours 
(altruism, 
empathy, 
caring, ethical 
behaviour; 
academic 
engagement; 
persistence; 
valuing school; 
efficacy; civic 
engagement 
and 
citizenship). 
3-year Service 
Learning 
programme 
based on 11 
Essential 
Elements of 
Service 
Learning and 
incorporating 
connections to 
CE. 
Quantitative 
57-item student 
survey pre- and 
post-test. 
Scales = 
Caring and 
altruism, 
School 
community, 
Citizenship and 
civic 
engagement, 
Valuing school 
and Respect). 
 
Quantitative 
Statistically significant differences between 
participants and controls on subscales: 
School community: p < .001* 
Citizenship and civic engagement: p < .01* 
Aggregate subscales score: p < .001* 
 
Non-significant differences: 
Valuing school: p = 0.074 
Respect: p = 0.059 
 
 
11 
 
Study  Aims Participants 
& Setting 
Design Theoretical 
basis 
Intervention Outcome 
Measures 
Findings  
(* = significance or effect size not reported 
due to insufficient data) 
Long (2014) Explore 
effects of 
integrating 
CE into a 
history 
curriculum 
on students’ 
character. 
120 high 
school 
students aged 
15-18. 
Georgia USA.  
One urban 
high school, 5 
history 
classes 
Exptl; 4 
classes 
randomly 
allocated 
to CE 
class and 
1 to 
control. 
Mixed:  
Character as 
set of 
psychological 
skills. Stages 
of moral 
development. 
CE through 
historical 
storytelling and 
virtue and 
ethical 
goodness  
4 history 
lessons 
incorporating 
CE through 
historical 
storytelling and 
discussion of 
related ethical 
dilemmas.  
Quantitative 
Commitment to 
Ethical 
Goodness 
(CEG) Scale 
(Narvaez, 
Bock, & 
Vaydich, 2008) 
administered to 
students pre- 
and post-test. 
Quantitative 
No significant differences. 
No pre- to post-test difference in CEG Scale 
scores for participants (p=0.33) or controls 
(p= 0.74).  
 
 
 
 
 
Pike, 
Lickona, and 
Nesfield 
(2015) 
To 
investigate 
the effects of 
Narnian 
Virtues prog. 
on: 
U’standing 
of the 12 
Narnian 
virtues; 
application 
of the virtues 
to everyday 
life; 
personal 
ethical 
responses to 
the novel. 
160 primary 
and 
secondary 
students aged 
9-14. 
Yorkshire,  
UK. 5 
schools.  
7 classes: 
2 x Y5/6   
2 x Y7   
2 x Y8 (1 
Christian 
ethos school; 
1 village 
school) 
1 x Y9 
(diverse 
urban school) 
Pilot study. 
Quasi-
exptl 
design.  
Pre/post-
test within-
subjects. 
Neo-
Aristotelian 
approach. 
Virtues as 
traits. Linked to 
Positive 
Psychology 
and character 
strengths. 
Virtues = 
universal. 
Purpose of 
Character 
Education = to 
become good 
by upholding 
universal moral 
laws. 
 
6-week CE 
programme 
developed 
around a CS 
Lewis novel 
with activities 
based on 
virtues 
(different 
programme for 
each year 
group). 
 
Quantitative 
Q’aire 1: virtue 
knowledge, 
self-reported 
virtues, 
personality 
self-ratings.  
Q’aire 2: 
knowledge and 
understanding 
of virtues  
 
Qualitative 
Journal 
analysis, focus 
groups and 
semi-structured 
interviews. 
 
Quantitative: (Results given for Y7 & Y8 only; 
additional data taken from Francis, Pike, 
Lickona, Lankshear, and Nesfield (2018)). 
  
Q’aire 1:  Statistically significant increase in 
knowledge of Narnian character virtues: (p < 
0.001, d = .338 (small))2. No significant 
change in virtue or personality self-ratings. 
Q’aire 2: Increased mean scores in from pre- 
to post-test.*  
 
Qualitative 
Students related scenarios in novel back to 
their own lives e.g. temptations of social 
media. Students individually selected virtues 
they wanted to work on. 
Parental engagement identified as important.  
Virtues referred to most = self-control, 
humility, hard-work and fortitude.  
                                                          
2 d= Cohen’s D:  small= 0.2, medium= 0.5 and large= 0.8  
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Study  Aims Participants 
& Setting 
Design Theoretical 
basis 
Intervention Outcome 
Measures 
Findings  
(* = significance or effect size not reported 
due to insufficient data) 
Seider, 
Novick, and 
Gomez 
(2013) 
To 
investigate 
the effects of 
CE progs 
aimed to 
develop 
either moral 
or 
performance 
character. 
653 middle-
school 
students aged 
10-14. 
 
USA. 3 inner-
city ‘Charter’ 
middle 
schools. 
Quasi-
exptl. 
Compared 
students 
on the two 
CE progs. 
Mixed: 
Character as 
set of moral 
and 
performance 
strengths.  
Character as 
psychological 
characteristics 
that enable 
individuals to 
function as 
competent 
moral agents.  
Over one 
school year: 2 
schools 
followed  
Advisory 
Programming 
intervention 
aimed at 
performance 
character;  
1school 
followed  
Ethical 
Philosophy 
Programming 
intervention 
aimed at moral 
character. 
Quantitative  
Self-rating 
scales on: 
Moral 
Character 
Strengths 
(Academic 
integrity; 
Ethical Identity; 
Social 
Responsibility) 
and 
Performance 
Character 
Strengths 
(Community; 
Courage; 
Perseverance) 
 
Quantitative 
No significant difference between groups in: 
Ethical Identity, Courage, Social 
Responsibility (p>.05). 
 
Statistically significant differences between 
groups in:  
Perseverance (Advisory Programming > 
Ethical Philosophy, p= .02; d = .20 (small)).  
Community connectedness (Advisory 
Programming > Ethical Philosophy, p = .05; d 
= .20 (small)).  
Academic integrity (Ethical Philosophy > 
Advisory Programming, p = .005; d = .17 
(small)). 
Seroczynski, 
Johnson, 
Lamb, and 
Gustman 
(2011) 
To 
investigate 
the effect of 
a literature-
based CE 
programme 
on virtuous 
behaviour in 
‘delinquent’ 
youth. 
22 male and 
7 female 
adolescents 
aged 14-18. 
2 teachers. 
Indiana USA. 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Centre in a 
midsize city. 
 
Quasi-
exptl: 
compared 
students 
rated by 
teachers 
as 
engaged 
or not 
engaged 
with CE 
i’vention 
prog. 
Mixed: 
Combines 
Aristotelian and 
Thomist 
theories of 
virtue with 
Kohlbergian 
stages of moral 
development. 
Purpose of CE 
= moral 
development 
and virtuous 
behaviour.  
 
Academic day-
treatment 
programme. 
Semester-long 
programme 
developed 
around a Harry 
Potter novel 
with activities 
based on 
virtues. 
 
Quantitative 
Adapted 
version of 
Youth Virtues 
Scale (Cawley, 
Martin, and 
Johnson 
(2000)) – self 
and teacher 
ratings. 
Index of Self-
Esteem 
(Hudson, 
1992). 
Sociomoral 
Reflection 
Quantitative 
(Employed p value of 0.1 due to small 
sample size) 
 
YVS: Statistically significant difference 
between engaged and disengaged groups’ 
post-test teacher-reported virtuous behaviour 
scores (p=.03).  
 
Statistically significant difference between 
engaged and disengaged groups’ self-
reported fidelity (p=.08) and charity (p=.04). 
No statistically significant differences in: 
fortitude, hope, justice, prudence and 
temperance.  
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Study  Aims Participants 
& Setting 
Design Theoretical 
basis 
Intervention Outcome 
Measures 
Findings  
(* = significance or effect size not reported 
due to insufficient data) 
Measure Short 
Form (SRM-
SF) (Gibbs, 
Basinger, & 
Fuller, 1992), 
based on 4 
stages of moral 
reasoning 
 
Qualitative 
Analysis of 
weekly class 
discussions 
and diary 
entries. 
SRM-SF: No significant differences between 
pre- and post- scores between groups. 
 
Qualitative 
Latent content analysis: Key points from 
discussions: 
Students gave examples from own lives of 
times when they had to break the rules to 
uphold a virtue.  
Students identified some virtues among the 
things they wanted for themselves in the 
future. 
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Table 5 Weight of Evidence of review studies  
(adapted from Gough, 2007) 
 
 
 
Weight of Evidence 
A Soundness of 
studies (internal 
methodological 
coherence) 
B Appropriateness 
of the research 
design and 
analysis  
C Relevance 
of the study to 
review 
question 
 
D Overall 
weight, taking 
into account 
A, B and C 
Arthur, 
Harrison, et 
al. (2017) 
Low Low Low/Medium Low 
Billig et al. 
(2008) 
Medium Medium Low/Medium Medium 
Long (2014) Low Low Low Low 
Pike et al. 
(2015) 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Seider et al. 
(2013) 
Low/Medium Low/Medium Low/Medium Low/Medium 
Seroczynski 
et al. (2011) 
Low Low Low/Medium Low 
1.3 Review Findings 
1.3.1 Theoretical approaches 
The studies included in this review reflect the concerns that exist in the field more 
widely in relation to the wide variety of theoretical underpinnings of CE (Berkowitz, 
2012). Theoretical approaches varied between and even within studies. Virtue-based 
approaches to CE (Arthur, Harrison, et al., 2017; Pike et al., 2015; Seroczynski et al., 
2011) stemmed from a philosophical virtue ethical stance, which was related by Pike 
et al. (2015) and Seider et al. (2013) to psychological theory through Peterson and 
Seligman’s (2004) concept of character strengths. These contrasted with neo-
Kohlbergian approaches to CE which focused more on the rational processes 
underpinning moral development (Long, 2014; Seroczynski et al., 2011). Lapsley 
and Narvaez (2006) argue that a narrow and behaviourist focus on developing 
virtuous behaviours in the USA has led to the conflation of virtue development and 
moral duty and has made the unique task of CE unclear. The UK-based studies both 
made explicit reference to virtues as specific traits (Arthur, Harrison, et al., 2017; 
Pike et al., 2015), reflecting the predominant neo-Aristotelian approach to CE in the 
UK (Arthur, Harrison, Carr, et al., 2014). One USA-based study did not offer clear 
theoretical underpinnings; three made some reference to stages of moral 
development. The vast differences in theoretical stances and related differences in 
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studies’ aims, designs, intervention strategies and outcome measures make it 
difficult to produce a meaningful synthesis of the reviewed studies.  
1.3.2 Study design 
Designs varied across studies. Five studies used an experimental or quasi-
experimental design. There was considerable variation in the function of the group 
used for comparison across each of these studies. One study had an experimental 
design in which participants were randomly allocated to the intervention or control 
condition (Long, 2014). Four studies used a quasi-experimental design. Billig et al. 
(2008) used a matched control group. Seroczynski et al. (2011) created a control 
group by retrospectively splitting the experimental group into two according to 
participants’ level of engagement with the intervention. Engagement level was 
judged on the amount of work participants completed and their level of involvement 
in class discussion, as judged through subjective observation. Seider et al. (2013) 
compared two Character Education interventions with a different focus, whilst Pike et 
al. (2015) used a within-subjects pre-/post-test design. The remaining study used a 
case study design (Arthur, Harrison, et al., 2017), which did not allow for comparison 
with matched controls. 
1.3.3 Interventions  
Interventions also varied across studies. Duration of interventions ranged from four 
lessons to three years. Some interventions had more taught components. For 
example, Pike et al. (2015) and Seroczynski et al. (2011) investigated the effect of 
taught intervention programmes based on novels which were specifically aimed at 
developing knowledge and understanding of virtues. Similarly, Long (2014) and 
Seider et al. (2013) also investigated the effect of taught intervention programmes. 
These were based on exploring the actions of prominent historical or literary figures 
and how they demonstrated character. There were taught elements to the 
interventions described by both Arthur, Harrison, et al. (2017) and Billig et al. (2008). 
However, these were less formal. Arthur, Harrison, et al. (2017) described three 
schools’ different ‘taught, caught and sought’ (p.17) approaches to CE, rather than 
focusing on the effects of a specific intervention programme. Billig et al. (2008) 
investigated the effects of a Service Learning programme which entailed students 
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organising community service projects and reflecting on these. The interventions in 
all studies incorporated time for students to reflect on and discuss moral issues.  
1.3.4 Outcomes and effectiveness 
It is important to note that the way in which character was operationalised and 
measured varied in each study, contributing to the difficulty in making comparisons 
between studies. Some studies used ratings of behaviour as a measure of virtue, 
either through self-report (Arthur, Harrison, et al., 2017; Pike et al., 2015), or a 
combination of self-report and teacher-report (Seroczynski et al., 2011). Seider et al. 
(2013) and Billig et al. (2008) investigated self-reported character strengths or 
prosocial behaviours, which could be linked to moral virtues as they measured moral 
motivations and actions. The Moral Self-Relevance questionnaire (Patrick & Gibbs, 
2012) used by Arthur, Harrison, et al. (2017) asked participants to identify which 
values are most important to them and therefore could also offer a measure of 
motivation. Long (2014) used the Commitment to Ethical Goodness scale (Narvaez 
et al., 2008), which measures ethical focus and motivation.  
Some studies used measures which focused on moral reasoning, which might be 
likened to Aristotle’s (2009) cognitive component of virtue. Arthur, Harrison, et al. 
(2017) used the Adolescent Intermediate Concept Measure (Ad-ICM,Thoma, 
Derryberry, & Crowson, 2013). They claim it gives a measure of virtue reasoning and 
that this is an important component of both virtue and practical wisdom. This is the 
only mention of practical wisdom across all the studies. Seroczynski et al. (2011) 
used the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (Gibbs et al., 1992), which has 
its origins in the Kohlbergian cognitive developmental domain. This was intended to 
give a measure of stage of moral development, based on whether participants’ 
responses matched pre-determined moral judgments.  
None of the studies used outcome measures that captured all three components of 
virtue put forward by Aristotle (cognition, affect and action). Measures focused on 
self-reported action do not address the cognitive processes or feelings behind 
participants’ reported moral virtues. Those focused on ethical motivation or 
knowledge and understanding of virtues do not address action. Pike et al. (2015) 
highlighted the important difference between knowing about virtues and choosing to 
act on them. Therefore, although each study’s outcome measures are in some way 
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connected to virtue, none were able to offer a comprehensive assessment of all 
three components (Aristotle, 2009) of moral virtue.  
Where possible, statistical significance and effect sizes are quoted for each study. It 
was not possible to calculate effect sizes for every study or for every data set within 
studies due to insufficient data. Effect sizes can provide important information which 
cannot be determined from statistical significance alone, about the magnitude of an 
intervention’s effect (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). However, although according to the 
American Psychological Association (2001, p. 25) ‘it is almost always necessary to 
include some index of effect size or strength of relationship’, care must be taken 
about using effect sizes to compare interventions with different theoretical bases, 
procedures and outcome measures (Coe, 2002; Glass, McGaw, & Smith, 1981), as 
is the case in this review. Whilst effect sizes may show the magnitude of the effect of 
interventions within individual studies, comparisons between studies should be made 
with caution.   
Significant differences in some outcomes relating to moral virtue were found in four 
studies (Billig et al., 2008; Pike et al., 2015; Seider et al., 2013; Seroczynski et al., 
2011). Billig et al. (2008) found an overall significant difference in pre-/post-test 
scores between the experimental and control group participants in two of the five 
subscales (‘Citizenship and civic engagement’ (p<.01) and ‘School community’ 
(p<.001) and in their ‘Aggregate’ scores (p<.001) across the five scales. However, it 
should be acknowledged that scores decreased from pre-test to post-test on all 
subscales for both groups, which the authors put down to having administered the 
post-test surveys at the end of term. Pike et al. (2015) found a significant difference 
in participants’ knowledge and understanding of the 12 virtues taught in the Narnian 
Virtues programme from pre- to post-test (p<.001). The magnitude of this effect was 
small (d=.338). They also found an increase in mean scores on Questionnaire 2 
which tested participants’ definitions of the virtues and their explanations of how one 
develops good character. However, no figures or statistics are provided in the report 
to evidence this, making it a less reliable finding. Seider et al. (2013) found 
statistically significant differences between moral CE and performance CE students 
on three of the six character trait subscales; ‘Academic Integrity’ (p=.005, d=.17); 
‘Perseverance’ (p=.20, d=.20) and ‘Community Connectedness’ (p=.05, d=.20). 
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However, the magnitude of all three effects was small and there is no information 
provided about each intervention group’s level of fidelity to the programme, or the 
extent to which the programmes may have overlapped in their content. Seroczynski 
et al. (2011) found statistically significant differences between teacher-reported 
overall gains in virtuous behaviour from pre- to post-test for students judged to be 
‘engaged’ in the intervention (p=.03). Having set a p value of 0.1 due to small sample 
size, they also found significant differences in students’ self-reports of fidelity (p=.08) 
and charity (p=.04) between the ‘engaged’ and the ‘disengaged’ students’ self-
ratings post-test. However, as discussed above, allocation to the ‘engaged’ or 
‘disengaged’ condition was somewhat arbitrary, making it difficult to draw firm 
conclusions about the intervention’s effects on moral virtue. It is also important to 
note that sample size varied throughout the programme due to young people leaving 
the centre, therefore it is not clear exactly how many participants were involved in 
pre- and post- test data analysis. This calls the validity of these findings into 
question. 
Arthur, Harrison, et al. (2017) found combined mean scores of Year 7 and Year 12 
students on the Ad-ICM (Secondary School 1 = 49%; Secondary School 2 = 52%) 
were higher than those achieved in previous CE research with Year 10 students 
(43%). The authors do not quote statistical significance levels. When broken down 
by year group in School 1, mean Ad-ICM scores for Year 7 were 40% and mean 
scores for Year 12 were 54%, suggesting there could be a significant effect of age 
on virtue reasoning ability. On the Moral Self-Relevance questionnaire, students in 
both schools rated moral virtues more highly than performance virtues, suggesting 
CE may have increased students’ motivation to enact moral virtues. However, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions from this without a control comparison group as it may 
be that all young people naturally value moral over performance virtues, given 
humans’ innate prosociality (Daniel, 2007). 
Long (2014) found no significant difference in participants’ scores on the 
Commitment to Ethical Goodness (CEG) scale from pre- to post-test. This may be 
due to the short duration of the intervention. It may also be that the CEG was not the 
most appropriate outcome measure. As Pike et al. (2015) found, gains in the short-
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term are more likely to relate to knowledge and understanding of the material 
presented on the programme, rather than changes in motivation or behaviour. 
Qualitative data from Arthur, Harrison, et al. (2017), Pike et al. (2015) and 
Seroczynski et al. (2011) provides further detail about the effects of interventions on 
moral virtue. Young people in Arthur, Harrison, et al. (2017) described the impact CE 
had on their understanding and application of virtues. CE led to shared use of the 
language of virtue between staff and students, suggesting an effect on the cognitive 
component of virtue. Students engaged regularly in self-reflection and this helped 
them reason about their behaviour outside school. Pike et al. (2015) and 
Seroczynski et al. (2011) describe discussions with students about how the virtues 
they were learning about through the novels apply to their own lives. Students in all 
three studies were able to apply a combination of virtues to everyday situations to 
consider how they might think or behave when faced with a dilemma. Seroczynski et 
al. (2011) also report discussions with participants about situations where virtues 
conflict with one-another and they have broken a rule to uphold a virtue they valued 
more. These descriptions offer real-life accounts of the application of moral virtue, 
which take into account the influence of situational factors and what happens when a 
situation raises competing virtue demands, something the quantitative ratings scales 
could not do. Although not explicitly linked with practical wisdom in the studies, it 
could be argued that the idea of applying virtues to everyday situations and weighing 
competing virtues is suggestive of some form of practical wisdom. 
1.3.5 Key Findings 
The aim of the current review was to investigate the effects of CE interventions on 
the moral virtues and practical wisdom of adolescents and to gain an understanding 
of the theoretical approaches underpinning CE programmes.  
Four studies found evidence of some effect of CE on outcomes related to moral 
virtues. Billig et al.’s (2008) Service Learning and Pike et al.’s (2015) Narnian Virtues 
programme were judged to have the highest weight of evidence of the reviewed 
studies. Both had a within-subjects design which allowed for comparison of scores 
relating to moral virtue from Time 1 to Time 2 and used strategies to try and control 
for the effects of extraneous variables. Both found significant effects of their 
intervention programmes on outcomes associated with moral virtue. However, these 
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findings should be interpreted with caution. Both studies relied on participants’ self-
report, which can be an unreliable measure (West, 2014). It was not possible to 
calculate an effect size for Billig et al. and the effect size of the results in Pike et al. 
was small. It is also important to be clear how each study defined and 
operationalised virtue. The significant effect of CE in Pike et al. related to 
participants’ increased knowledge of virtues, whilst the significant effect in Billig et al. 
was found in relation to reported behaviour. Neither measure could be said to 
incorporate the cognitive, affective and behavioural aspects believed by Aristotle 
(2009) to be crucial for virtue. However, the findings of these studies offer tentative 
support for the use of community-based Service Learning programmes or novel-
based programmes in developing some aspects of cognition and behaviour 
associated with moral virtue. 
None of the quantitative measures in the studies showed the interaction between 
virtues and situational factors highlighted by Lerner and Callina (2014) and none 
mentioned practical wisdom. Qualitative data from Pike et al. (2015) and Seroczynski 
et al. (2011) offers some evidence of young people weighing virtues according to the 
demands of the situation and suggests a more nuanced view of character which 
warrants further exploration. 
1.4 Discussion 
1.4.1 Limitations 
Some of the data included in the analysis was for students who were under the age 
of 13. This was because the target population of 13-18-year-olds was often part of 
data sets which included younger children and it was not possible to separate the 
findings by age group. Age may have had a significant influence on the findings, 
given that adolescence has been identified as a key period in character development 
(Lickona, 2014; Walker et al., 2017). In addition, although attempts were made to 
match control groups to experimental groups on variables such as age, gender, 
ethnicity and attainment, it is difficult to control for other variables beyond the scope 
of the intervention, such as school ethos and home life. It is also not possible to 
know the long-term effects of the interventions of the reviewed studies because none 
of the studies used follow-up measures to calculate the sustainability of reported 
gains in moral virtue.   
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Limitations in relation to the difficulties in synthesising and making comparisons 
between vastly different studies have been discussed throughout this review. The 
difference in theoretical underpinnings, aims, interventions and outcome measures 
of each of the studies made it difficult to draw reliable comparisons between them. 
This is an important finding which highlights a lack of coherence in definitions of 
character and understandings of the purpose of CE. The reviewed studies focused 
mainly on quantitative outcome measures, which tended to capture knowledge or 
behaviour in relation to moral virtue. To adopt outcome measures which isolate one 
of these components of character seems reductionist and gives a definitive measure 
or score which may not reflect an individual’s response in all situations. It seems that 
a focus on measurement and quantification (Walker et al., 2017) may have led CE 
down an objectivist path which has served to develop measurable components of 
character and ignore more subjective aspects.  
1.4.2 Conclusions 
Overall, the findings of the review serve to highlight the complexity inherent in 
operationalising concepts relating to character and in finding valid and reliable ways 
to measure the effects of CE interventions empirically. The studies offer some 
evidence that CE interventions can have a positive effect on the development of 
either knowledge of moral virtues, motivation to act according to moral virtues, or 
morally virtuous behaviour. However, greater clarity is needed as to the theoretical 
underpinnings of CE and which component(s) of moral virtue are being addressed by 
given outcome measures. The outcome measures quoted in the review do not seem 
to offer a satisfactory way of dealing with the theoretical complexity underpinning the 
concept of character. Furthermore, the outcome measures do not seem to offer a 
credible way of accounting for the mediating effect of the situation on morally 
virtuous thoughts, feelings and behaviour. If CE is to be effective in supporting young 
people to develop their ability to act in the right way at the right time for the right 
reasons, both research and practice need to be able to confidently address these 
complexities.   
1.4.3 Recommendations 
Further research is needed to address the limitations highlighted in this review. The 
age range covered by the reviewed studies is large and includes participants at 
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different stages of adolescence, which could mask differences in development of 
character and virtue. If moral virtue and practical wisdom do develop with age, as 
Aristotle (2009) argued, then it is possible that adolescents of different ages do not 
have the same understanding of virtues or hold the same priorities. This warrants 
further investigation. 
Further practical considerations about judging the effectiveness of CE programmes 
relate to the duration of intervention. Further investigation could provide more 
information as to the optimal length and frequency of CE interventions and the post-
intervention sustainability of any gains made.  
The findings of the review suggest CE programmes based on Service Learning or 
based on novels where the protagonists face ethical dilemmas could offer promising 
ways of developing some thoughts, feelings and actions associated with moral 
virtues. More research is needed to further explore the effects of CE interventions on 
all three aspects of virtue, rather than selecting outcome measures that focus on 
one. 
Finally, there is a need for greater clarity about the theoretical basis of character 
adopted by both researchers and practitioners and how this informs the aims of CE 
interventions and the outcomes prioritised. The reviewed studies suggest a heavy 
weighting within existing research towards quantitative data. In attempting to quantify 
and measure virtue, we risk missing the complexity of the interaction between 
personal understandings of virtue and the situation. Qualitative research is needed to 
explore the interaction between virtue and situation and the effect this can have on 
moral decision-making. This is further explored in the empirical research reported in 
Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2. Bridging Document 
2.1 Aims  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline how the main findings from my literature 
review generated the questions explored in my empirical research. I consider the 
potential contribution of the research to the field of Character Education (CE). I also 
outline the philosophical underpinnings of my research and how these influenced my 
methodology. Issues arising during the research and the way in which I reacted to 
these are explained, particularly in relation to the political and ethical implications of 
making empirical judgments about how to define wellbeing and morality. Reference 
is made throughout to my own axiological stance and how this influenced the 
decisions and interpretations I made throughout the research process. 
2.2 Why Character Education? 
I began with an interest in how educational psychologists could support schools to 
promote mental health and wellbeing. I was drawn towards a salutogenic 
(Antonovsky, 1979) approach to mental health and wellbeing, which emphasises 
promoting mental health and wellbeing over avoiding mental illness. Current CE is 
centred on the idea of ‘ “the flourishing pupil”–in contradistinction, for example, 
to…the “emotionally vulnerable pupil” ’ (Walker et al., 2015, p. 81). I believe CE 
positions young people as active constructors of their own value systems and 
decision-making capabilities. CE focuses on becoming a good person and living a 
good life and it is acknowledged that this is more complex than simply adhering to a 
set of predetermined moral duties or regulations (Aristotle, 2009; Jubilee Centre for 
Character and Virtues, 2017). Rather than possessing a collection of individual 
virtues, De Caro, Vaccarezza, and Niccoli (2018, p. 296) emphasise the importance 
of being oriented towards ‘the good’ overall. To know and enact the good is not to 
uphold moral virtues unquestioningly in every situation, but to recognise the nuances 
in different situations and adjust thoughts, feelings and behaviour accordingly. This 
emphasises the importance of taking ownership of one’s values and becoming an 
autonomous decision-maker (Arthur, Harrison, Kristjánsson, et al., 2014). I believe 
CE has the potential to equip young people with critical skills in thought, feeling and 
action that will enable them to develop their own personal understandings of the 
good and navigate the complexities of moral decision-making as they become older. 
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2.3 Philosophical Stance 
It is important to note that many have argued that psychologists should not be 
involved in issues relating to wellbeing (Fowers, 2012b). There are concerns 
Psychology will ‘cease to be a value-free science as soon as it starts to study virtue 
and character’ (Sanderse, 2016, p. 449). However, Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, and 
King (2008, p. 228) argue psychologists have a justified ‘place at the table’ in 
discussions about ‘the good life’. It is difficult to set out a psychological theory of 
character without looking to philosophical theory (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2011, p. 529). 
This section therefore explores how my Pragmatist stance influenced my approach 
to the research. Interrogating my philosophical stance in more detail raised questions 
for me and led me to adapt my empirical theories and approaches as the research 
went on. 
My Pragmatist stance has been largely influenced by Dewey. Dewey has been 
described as a Naturalist (Kirby, 2008; Maull, 2013). He saw nature as a ‘moving 
whole of interacting parts’ (Dewey, 1929, p. 232) which is constantly changing 
(Vaesen, 2014). Pragmatists believe all knowledge is contingent and is true as long 
as it contributes to better outcomes (Morgan, 2014). Through experience, we 
develop habits of action that help us know what to do in everyday situations (Rosiek, 
2013). However, because the world is constantly changing, we are frequently 
presented with situations for which our habits do not prepare us; in these situations, 
we need to engage in inquiry to find the best course of action (Dewey, 1938).  
As my thinking about character developed, I began to see obvious parallels between 
these Pragmatist ideas and Aristotle’s (2009) ideas about character. These parallels 
have been highlighted by psychologists, Narvaez and Lapsley (2014). Aristotle 
described virtues as habits but acknowledged that habits would not suffice in every 
situation and at these times we would need to employ practical wisdom to discern 
the best course of action. This is similar to Dewey’s (1938) logical inquiry, which is 
also employed to meet the demands of situations when habits may not suffice. 
However, the philosophical underpinnings of the theories differ in a way that has 
important implications for empirical definitions and operationalisations of character. 
Although both Aristotle and Dewey have been described as Naturalists (Hoy, 2000), 
Aristotle’s Naturalism was based on the teleological belief that flourishing is the 
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ultimate goal of human existence (Maull, 2013). However, Dewey rejected the 
foundationalist notion of a telos; he believed our understandings of what is right and 
good can only come through our lived experience and considering how we can better 
it (Maull, 2013). This distinction is important because Dewey’s stance implies there is 
no objective understanding of what is right and good (Lapsley, 2016). This does not 
mean that there can be no understanding of what is right and good, simply that these 
understandings of what is right and good come from our transactions with others in 
the community (Biesta, 2014), rather than from antecedent moral principles. Based 
on this Pragmatist view, it does not make sense to think of virtues as traits that can 
exist within individuals; the good can only be realised in transactions with others.  
As my ideas progressed throughout the research, my Pragmatist stance led me to 
favour psychological theories of character emphasising the interaction between 
person and context, such as those of Lerner and Callina (2014) and Nucci (2017). 
Whilst these stances satisfied my philosophical stance, they meant rejecting trait 
theories of virtue, which seem popular based on the findings of my literature review. 
It has been argued that virtue is what distinguishes CE from other forms of ME 
(Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006). Without virtue I was not sure whether I still had grounds 
for studying character as a separate discipline. This was particularly difficult given 
that the concepts of wellbeing, virtue and practical wisdom all started as 
philosophical, not psychological concepts. However, as Shotter and Tsoukas (2014) 
point out, CE is about becoming good and not simply about knowing what goodness 
is. Therefore, my empirical investigations should centre on this notion of becoming 
good. This is not simply about applying reason, as suggested by Kohlberg’s (1984) 
moral stage theory. Wisdom in action requires the ability to tailor moral thought, 
feeling and action to the demands of the current situation in order to make wise and 
informed decisions (Arthur, Harrison, Kristjánsson, et al., 2014). Sometimes these 
decisions cannot be reduced to pure reason alone. It is about developing an 
understanding of the good relevant to one’s context and enacting this flexibly through 
balancing competing demands in the situation (Aristotle, 2009; Dewey, 1946). 
Fesmire (2003) argues only character can address such questions in sufficient levels 
of complexity. This led me to consider more closely the concept of practical wisdom 
and how it might be explored empirically. It seemed logical to me that this should be 
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done by developing a qualitative understanding of person-context interactions, as 
discussed further in Chapter 3.  
2.4 Developing my empirical research question 
The literature review findings reinforced assertions by Curren (2016) and 
Kristjánsson (2017) that there is currently no dominant psychological theory 
underpinning CE. Each study in the literature review conceptualised character and 
virtue, and thus enacted CE, slightly differently. Most studies made some mention of 
virtues or character strengths. Some also referred to measures of moral reasoning 
that have been associated with a more rational, deontological stance to moral 
development, such as the Ad-ICM (Thoma et al., 2013) in Arthur, Kristjánsson, et al. 
(2017) or the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (Gibbs et al., 1992) in 
Seroczynski et al. (2011). The results of the systematic literature review highlight the 
diverse range of theoretical assumptions underpinning CE and go some way to 
explaining why CE and Moral Education are often conflated (Lapsley & Yeager, 
2013).  
Four studies found a small effect of CE on at least some aspect of moral virtue, 
although two of these were judged to have low weight of evidence. The other two 
were judged to have medium weight of evidence. I was surprised to find that all the 
studies employed at least some quantitative measurements of virtues/character 
strengths and that data was collected mainly through self-report rating scales. None 
of these outcome measures considered the influence different situations might have 
on individuals’ knowledge and understanding or enactment of virtues. No studies 
mentioned practical wisdom, despite this being a key component of Aristotelian 
theory on character which has inspired many modern-day Character Education 
programmes (Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2017; Kristjánsson, 2017).  
The aim of the empirical research was therefore to develop a qualitative 
understanding of the interaction between personal understandings of virtue and 
situational factors in moral decision-making. Although some have argued for a stage 
model of character development in which practical wisdom might not be expected to 
develop until adulthood (Burnyeat, 1980; Sanderse, 2015); others have argued that 
the ability to integrate beliefs about the good with the demands of the situation is 
constantly developing and therefore individuals possess practical wisdom from an 
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early age (De Caro et al., 2018; Sherman, 1989). I agree with the latter view. Rather 
than seeking to operationalise practical wisdom and determine whether an individual 
possesses it, I began from the assumption that everyone has practical wisdom in 
different stages of development and research should focus on what decision-making 
processes entail at different stages of development. A qualitative exploration of the 
ways in which young people incorporate their understandings of the good with the 
demands of the situation could help to inform the development of CE programmes 
which are tailored to the needs and concerns of young people.  
2.5 Methodology 
The purpose of pragmatic inquiry is to produce knowledge of practical value (Dewey, 
1938). I wanted my research to be of practical value to the participating students and 
to their wider school community. Goldkuhl (2012a) outlines three different forms of 
Pragmatism in social sciences research: functional (knowledge for action); referential 
(knowledge about action); and methodological (knowledge through action). I think my 
research best fits under the umbrella of referential Pragmatism. I wanted to better 
understand how adolescents go about applying their understanding of the good 
when faced with moral dilemmas in order to help teachers design and deliver CE 
lessons and character-based discussions.  
I adopted a constructivist Grounded Theory (GT) methodology because it seemed to 
fit most closely with Dewey’s (1938) ideas about building on existing knowledge and 
contributing to general practice. Grounded Theory is a ‘systematic and flexible way 
of collecting and analysing qualitative data’ which offers an interpretive analysis of 
data and makes the study of action central (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2). Whilst traditional 
GT emphasises the importance of inductive theory development and instructs the 
researcher not to apply preconceived theories (Glaser, 1998), Goldkuhl and 
Cronholm (2010) reject the idea that we should construct a theory based entirely on 
the data. ‘In a pure inductive abstraction…there is an obvious risk of knowledge 
isolation’ (Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010, p. 188). I therefore referred to the existing 
literature in the final stages of theory development to inform my GT.   
Whilst GT could offer a contribution to general practice, I also wanted to consider the 
impact of the research on local practice. I therefore incorporated principles of 
Practice Research into my GT process. Practice Research is a form of Action 
28 
 
Research which emphasises the need to combine local practice interests with 
research interests applicable to the general population (Goldkuhl, 2012b). I wanted 
to give participants some ownership over the data so it could inform future planning 
for CE in that context. I took an early version of my emerging theory back to 
participants to seek feedback, as recommended in Charmaz (2006). I also asked 
them how they wanted to use the data moving forward. This fits with Goldkuhl’s 
(2012a) functional Pragmatic research which emphasises knowledge for action. 
Discussing the research findings with the participants was intended to help them 
begin to consider how the findings might be applied either by them as individuals or 
by the school community more widely.  
I followed Charmaz’s (2006) basic GT procedure. Data collection and data analysis 
occurred simultaneously, with early stages of analysis helping to refine questions 
and highlight areas of focus for subsequent interviews. I wrote memos throughout 
each stage of the process, which helped me to focus codes, to begin to identify 
categories and to start to develop theories about the relationships within and 
between categories. As a novice researcher, structure was important to help guide 
my analysis (Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, I used Corbin and Strauss’ (1990) Axial 
Codes and Glaser’s (1978) Theoretical Codes as a guide to inform my ideas at the 
relevant stages of coding, though I did not adhere strictly to either. The research was 
an iterative process, with new data and codes prompting me to revisit and refine 
emerging codes and categories throughout. Towards the end of the data analysis 
process, once some fairly clear categories had emerged, I began to combine these 
ideas with existing ideas in the literature, as recommended by Goldkuhl and 
Cronholm (2010). I generated my final theory through a process of mapping, 
theoretical sorting and combining memos, integrating ideas from relevant literature.  
2.6 Ethical considerations 
The research received ethical approval from Newcastle University. Participants were 
given an information sheet, as well as the opportunity to attend a briefing session 
outlining the research process and purpose in more detail. Written consent was 
sought both from participants and their parents and they were regularly reminded of 
their right to withdraw from the study at any time. All participants were given a 
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pseudonym in order to maintain confidentiality. Their data was securely stored, with 
all identifiable information kept secure.  
When designing and undertaking the research, I tried to remain alert to the ongoing 
ethical dimensions inherent in the research process (Ramcharan & Cutcliffe, 2001). 
When designing interview questions, I was conscious that it is important to consider 
the ethical ramifications of asking people to discuss dilemmas which could bring up 
painful thoughts and feelings for them (C. Marshall & Rossman, 2016). To address 
this, I gave participants a questionnaire prior to the interviews to determine the kinds 
of situations they felt would commonly cause them a dilemma. I used this information 
to develop the dilemmas I presented to participants in the interviews. I based 
dilemmas on hypothetical characters and asked participants to choose one of three 
dilemmas they felt most comfortable to explore. I remained sensitive to participants’ 
reactions during the interviews and focus groups, adjusting my comments and 
questions accordingly. I took care to report data sensitively and to maintain 
participants’ anonymity, respecting requests not to include some comments in the 
analysis.   
I also considered the wider ethical implications presented by the research. Some of 
the philosophical considerations outlined in the discussion above also raise ethical 
issues. One important consideration is the power relations inherent in educating for 
character. Ecclestone (2012) criticises CE as a form of state control. Although neo-
Aristotelian CE cites its main aim as flourishing (Kristjánsson, 2017), Lapsley and 
Narvaez (2006) highlight that some CE programmes have adopted behaviourist 
approaches, which often attempt to instil non-negotiable moral codes in pupils 
(Smith, Cowie, & Blades, 2015). Such approaches teach passive external conformity 
(B. White, 2015), rather than developing an intrinsic motivation to enact moral virtues 
and promote wellbeing. In the UK, government-commissioned research into 
character has highlighted its benefits in terms of attainment, behaviour and 
employability (Cullinane & Montacute, 2017). The government’s current approach to 
CE lists among its aims to ‘set (young people) up for success in further study and the 
world and work’ (Department for Education, 2019).  These examples illustrate 
Ecclestone’s (2012) warnings about state control and highlight the importance of 
making both school staff and students who are participating in CE programmes 
aware of their intended purpose. I wanted my research to focus on the intrinsic 
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benefits of CE and I think it is important to continue to foreground this. Educational 
psychologists could play a key role in supporting teachers and young people to 
understand the aims and theoretical underpinnings of CE, moving away from 
behaviourist notions of character as compliance towards more nuanced 
understandings of context-sensitive autonomous moral decision-making. 
Another important ethical consideration was whether psychologists should make 
value judgments about what constitutes the good life (Fowers, 2012b). My 
Pragmatist stance, according to which fact-value distinctions are arbitrary, implies 
moral relativism.  A morally relativist stance is difficult to maintain for several 
reasons. Firstly, Welch (2011) argued that if no form of morality is better than any 
other, then there is no need for CE because we would not know what to teach. I 
would counter this argument by repositioning the purpose of CE as being to equip 
young people with the ability to make decisions about what constitutes a good life 
and helping them to develop the practical wisdom to enact this understanding of the 
good. I do not refute the idea that it is possible to develop an understanding of the 
good but I believe this understanding arises naturally from an individual’s interactions 
within their social context, rather than from a supernatural telos. This belief is likely to 
be in direct conflict with the beliefs of those who believe morals are universal, or 
those whose religious belief places a god or gods as the source of understandings of 
what it means to be good. I was mindful of the need to respect these beliefs. 
In my opinion, beliefs about the nature of morality and what it means to uphold the 
good are fundamental. It is impossible to avoid taking a stance on this. It is important 
to be aware of one’s stance, but equally it is not the role of psychologists to define 
the good. Moral relativism appeals to me in this sense because it leaves room for 
people to discover and express their own understandings of the good. The empirical 
research therefore intended to focus on decision-making processes, rather than on 
judging whether participants’ beliefs and actions should be considered morally right 
or wrong.   
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Chapter 3. Empirical Research 
Abstract 
There have been many attempts to develop psychological understandings of 
Character Education in recent years. Social cognitivists have rejected trait theories of 
virtue in favour of relational theories that emphasise person-situation interactions. 
The current research used a Grounded Theory methodology to explore the ways in 
which personal virtue beliefs and situational factors interact in young people’s moral 
decision-making. This ability has been likened to the Aristotelian notion of practical 
wisdom. Eighteen secondary school pupils aged between 12 and 15 took part in 
semi-structured interviews focusing on their beliefs about what it means to live a 
good life and how these interact with situational factors to inform their response to 
moral dilemmas. The findings suggest the extent to which young people apply 
personal understandings of virtue to their moral decisions depends on a range of 
interconnected situational variables, which vary according to the context in which the 
dilemma presents. The study concludes that a focus on developing young people’s 
ability to reflect on their understandings of virtue and how these vary according to the 
situation offers a promising focus for Character Education interventions. Implications 
for educational psychology practice and for future research are discussed. 
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Practical wisdom: A Grounded Theory of the interaction between young 
people’s personal understandings of the good and salient situational factors in 
moral decision making. 
3.1 Introduction  
3.1.1 Context: The origins of Character Education  
The concept of practical wisdom originates from Aristotle’s (2009) work on character. 
Aristotle’s theory of character is associated with a virtue ethical understanding of 
morality which emphasises the importance of promoting individual and collective 
wellbeing over acting out of a sense of moral duty (Kristjánsson, 2014a, p. 49). 
According to Aristotle (2009), practical wisdom is needed, along with virtue, in order 
to develop the good character required to live a good life (see Chapter 2, p. 23 or 
further discussion of ‘the good’). Aristotle believed a person of good character 
possesses prosocial habits of moral excellence, known as virtues, which help them 
to act in the best interests of self and others (Daniel, 2007). Practical wisdom has 
been conceived of as a kind of meta-virtue which enables us to weigh the demands 
of competing virtues alongside the demands of a situation in order to act in the way 
we judge to be right in that particular context (Arthur, Kristjánsson, et al., 2017, see 
Chapter 1, p. 2 for further details). The constructs of virtue and practical wisdom form 
the basis of the neo-Aristotelian approach to Character Education (CE), which 
seems to predominate in the UK (Arthur, Harrison, Kristjánsson, et al., 2014; Curren, 
2010).  
3.1.2 Beyond trait theories of character 
Developing a psychological understanding of the Aristotelian concepts of virtue and 
practical wisdom have proved difficult (Lapsley, 2016). Attempts to offer an empirical 
exploration of character development led some researchers to adopt a trait 
conceptualisation of virtue (Sanderse, 2016), which has been criticised for failing to 
reflect the complexity of real-life applications of virtue (Doris, 2002, see Chapter 1, p. 
3 for details). Theories of character as a set of virtues that exist independently of 
context are therefore judged by some psychologists to be meaningless (Callina & 
Lerner, 2017; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2006; Nucci, 2018). A social cognitive perspective 
proposes an alternative theory that character is found in interactions between person 
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and context (Lerner, Vandell, & Tirrell, 2017; McGrath, 2017; Nucci, 2018). People 
will behave differently depending on context, making it difficult to define character in 
terms of consistent beliefs, behaviours or traits (Nucci, 2018). Character is a ‘system 
that enables the person to engage the social world as a moral agent’ (Nucci, 2017, p. 
14), not a collection of virtues. An empirical understanding of character which can 
take into account the complexity of these interactions is needed. 
3.1.3 An empirical understanding of practical wisdom 
Taking a social-cognitive approach, character entails having an understanding of 
how to live a good life and being able to adapt this understanding to do what is right 
for oneself and for others in a given situation (Callina et al., 2017). This ability to 
apply ‘the right capabilities in the right manner for the moment’ (Narvaez, 2018, p. 
456) has also been called ethical expertise and has been equated with Aristotelian 
practical wisdom (De Caro et al., 2018; Narvaez & Bock, 2014). According to De 
Caro et al. (2018) ethical expertise comprises having a good understanding of what 
one believes to be good and applying this understanding flexibly according to the 
features of the specific situation one finds oneself in. Narvaez and Bock (2014) apply 
dual processing theory to their theory of ethical expertise, incorporating both intuitive 
and deliberative processes in the application of moral virtue. They liken intuition to 
Aristotle’s virtue habits and deliberation to practical wisdom. 
Dual processing theory offers a social cognitive understanding of the way in which 
people make decisions. According to this theory, through experience, individuals 
build schemas, which are knowledge structures stored in memory and consisting of 
values, traits, goals, and behavioural scripts (Cantor, 1990). Virtue schemas are 
knowledge structures and memories which relate to our understanding of what it 
means to be good and lead a good life (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). Through a 
combination of biopsychosocial processes, we build a set of moral schemas that 
form our individual understandings of what it means to be a good person (Narvaez, 
2018). We gradually develop the declarative, procedural and conditional knowledge 
needed to become ethical experts (Narvaez & Bock, 2014).  
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Although not traits, virtues can still have a role to play in developing ethical expertise. 
De Caro et al. (2018) argue it does not make sense to separate moral virtues from 
practical wisdom:  
‘When one is virtuous, what one really possesses is the single virtue of practical 
wisdom, understood as ethical expertise – the other virtues are descriptive of 
such virtues in each different moral field’ (p. 294).  
Ethical expertise, which might also be called practical wisdom or virtue, entails 
incorporating all virtues into one satisfactory action. Individual moral virtues might be 
thought of as tools that help us to think and talk about the good and to make 
practically wise decisions. This suggests that the focus of CE should be developing 
practical wisdom, rather than developing individual virtues. 
3.1.4 Person-situation interactions in moral decision-making 
There are several potential pitfalls in investigating practical wisdom and it is argued 
by some it cannot be quantified or codified empirically (Lapsley, 2016; MacIntyre, 
2007). There are multiple definitions and understandings of practical wisdom both 
within and across disciplines (Lapsley, 2019). However, its constitutive and 
integrative functions are commonly cited (Darnell, Gulliford, Kristjánsson, & Paris, 
2019; Kristjánsson, 2014b; Lapsley, 2019). The constitutive element is the ability to 
notice that a situation is ethically relevant and the integrative function involves 
weighing and adjusting competing understandings of the good in complex situations. 
This integrative function highlights the importance of understanding how personal 
and situational factors interact in real-time decision-making (Wang, Batanova, Ferris, 
& Lerner, 2016). Real-time decisions must incorporate the important factors in ‘here 
and now situations’ and not simply impose ‘antecedently known eternal principles’ 
(Wren, 2014, p. 15). Developing an understanding of the integrative processes 
involved in moral decision-making could help elucidate the ways in which ‘here and 
now’ factors influence interpretations of the good in real-life situations.  
Models of decision-making across varied disciplines acknowledge this interaction 
between personal beliefs and situational factors. For example, Sternberg’s (1998) 
theory of wisdom outlines decision-making as a complex process of balancing 
interests of self and others with situational factors in order to promote the common 
good. Sternberg also highlights the mediating role of personal values in this process. 
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Similarly, Crossan et al.’s (2013) model of ethical decision-making acknowledges the 
interaction of both virtue and situational factors in the decision making process. 
Although these models acknowledge the interaction between situational factors and 
virtue, they do not offer contextual explanations of which virtues or situational factors 
are typically influential or how they interact.  
3.1.5 Practical wisdom in adolescence 
Adolescence is highlighted in the character development literature as an important 
period of moral development (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; S. A. Hardy & G. Carlo, 2005). 
There is evidence that adolescents are particularly susceptible to the influence of 
situational factors in their general judgment and decision-making (Albert & Steinberg, 
2011). Therefore educators must appreciate that ‘…what counts as virtuous 
behaviour for a teenager may not be so for a mature adult’ (Arthur, Kristjánsson, et 
al., 2017, p. 50). If character educators are to effectively support students to develop 
practical wisdom, they need to understand what influences their decisions about the 
good. 
Quantitative self-report studies suggest adolescents’ moral action is affected by 
situational factors, for example peer group norms (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, 
& Hitti, 2013; Mulvey & Killen, 2015; Piehler & Dishion, 2007) and the threat of verbal 
and physical aggression (Mulvey & Killen, 2016). However, such studies are often 
based on predetermined judgements about the morally acceptable course of action 
(Reilly & Narvaez, 2018), with many studies of morality judging adolescents’ 
decision-making according to adult understandings (Garrigan, Adlam, & Langdon, 
2018). They do not explain why or how participants arrive at their decisions or the 
personal understandings of virtue that inform their decisions. 
Dahl, Gingo, Uttich, and Turiel (2018) conducted a qualitative exploration of how 
adults and adolescents reason, analyse and evaluate moral problems. Rather than 
evaluating participants’ final decision, these qualitative accounts offered participants 
the opportunity to explain their moral judgments and demonstrated the complexity 
with which adolescents reasoned about moral dilemmas. Although the dilemmas 
posed in the study have been criticised for being based on a ‘never-in-a-lifetime' 
scenario (Killen & Mulvey, 2018, p. 112), this method marks a clear step towards 
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understanding how personal beliefs about the good and situational factors combine 
in moral decision-making.  
3.1.6 Aims of the research 
The current research sought to offer a qualitative account of adolescents’ moral 
decision-making, exploring how personal understandings of the good and situational 
factors were combined in the decision-making process. The research sought to 
explore the complexities inherent in moral dilemmas young people judged to be 
relevant to their own lives. It offered the opportunity to understand moral decision-
making from adolescents’ point of view and to consider the role education could play 
in supporting the development of practical wisdom.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants  
The research was undertaken in a secondary academy in the North East of England. 
The school is part of an academy chain with a strong Christian ethos focusing on the 
development of character. Character is also embedded throughout the school’s 
curricular and extra-curricular activities and its behaviour management policy.  
I met with the school’s Vice Principal to discuss my ideas for the research and to 
gain an understanding of the school’s priorities in relation to CE. We agreed I would 
explore pupils’ views about character and virtues and how they apply these in their 
decision-making. Opportunity sampling was used to recruit participants. I briefed two 
Year 8 and two Year 10 classes on what the research would entail. Eight Year 8 
students and twelve Year 10 students consented to take part in the research (see 
Appendix C and Appendix D). These students then attended a more detailed 
briefing. The final number of participants was eighteen, as two Year 8 students 
withdrew from the research. 
All Year 8 participants were girls. Four held no religious beliefs; two held Muslim 
beliefs. Of the Year 10 students, three were boys and nine were girls. The boys held 
no religious beliefs. Five girls held no religious beliefs; one held Muslim beliefs; two 
held Christian beliefs; and one held both Muslim and Christian beliefs. One Year 10 
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student had joined the school in June 2018; the other students had all attended since 
the beginning of Year 7. See Table 6 for further information about participants. 
Table 6 Participant profiles 
Pseudonym Age Year Group Gender Religious beliefs 
Jesse 12 8 Female Muslim 
Alex 14 10 Male Atheist 
Riley 14 10 Female Non-religious 
Rory 14 10 Female Muslim/Christian 
Sky 12 8 Female Muslim 
Elena 12 8 Female Non-religious 
Ash 14 10 Female Muslim 
Jordan 14 10 Female Non-religious 
Bob 15 10 Female Non-religious 
Charlie 14 10 Female Non-religious 
Ellis 14 10 Female Non-religious 
Robyn 12 8 Female Non-religious 
Morgan 14 10 Female Christian 
Jamie 14 10 Male Non-religious 
Sam 14 10 Female Christian 
Billie 14 10 Male Non-religious 
Millie 12 8 Female Non-religious 
Phoenix 12 8 Female Non-religious 
 
3.2.2 Methodological approach  
Adopting a Pragmatist world view (as discussed in Chapter 2, p. 27), I selected a 
Grounded Theory (GT) methodology. The methodology was based on Charmaz’s 
(2006, p. 6) key constructivist GT principles of ‘examining processes’, ‘making the 
study of action central’ and ‘creating abstract interpretive understandings of data’. 
Charmaz (2006) acknowledges the importance of grounding the theory initially in the 
data but also within existing literature, a practice which is central to Multi-Grounded 
Theory, an emerging form of GT which also influenced my approach (Goldkuhl & 
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Cronholm, 2010). GT was combined with a Practice Research methodology which 
emphasises the need to combine local practice interests with research interests 
applicable to the general population (Goldkuhl, 2012b). Previous research has 
adopted a similar approach (Teram, Schachter, & Stalker, 2005), taking GT data 
back to participants and giving them the opportunity to comment on emerging 
findings and discuss how they might take the data forward in their context.  
3.2.3 Procedure 
Questionnaires 
In the detailed briefing session, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire 
exploring the kinds of moral dilemmas they commonly face in their daily lives (See 
Appendix E). A broad definition of ‘moral’ similar to that of Dewey (1967) was 
adopted, according to which all actions which may impact on another person were 
considered moral. Dilemmas were taken from the ‘Good Character’ website 
(Denison, 2018), which contains a series of dilemmas specifically designed for 
discussion with young people. These dilemmas were grouped to create twelve 
overarching themes for the questionnaire (see Appendix F). Participants’ responses 
(see Appendix G) were used to generate fictional moral dilemmas to discuss in the 
interviews. The scenarios judged most likely to pose dilemmas for young people 
were bullying/falling out with friends; alcohol and drug use; and peer pressure. I 
developed dilemma scenarios for the individual interviews based on these themes 
and using Denison’s (2018) dilemmas as a basis. I used the website ‘Storyboard 
That’ to create comic strip versions of each scenario to make the stories more 
accessible for participants (see Appendix H). 
Interviews 
Individual interviews were conducted in a private room in school over a period of four 
weeks, with four to five interviews taking place each week. The interviews were 
semi-structured, starting from broad, open-ended questions (Charmaz, 2006; 
Gillham, 2000, see Appendix I). I prepared some possible follow-up questions but 
remained alert to interesting leads throughout the interview (Holstein & Gubrium, 
1995). Some questions were based on ‘sensitising concepts’ (Blumer, 1954) from 
existing CE theory and research and thus explored participants’ understandings of 
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moral virtues such as ‘honesty’, ‘respect’ and ‘integrity’ and of the concepts of ‘right’ 
and ‘good’ (see Appendix J). Some questions were based on Dilemma Analysis (C. 
Marshall, 2006); participants were given hypothetical dilemmas and asked to explain 
their thought process in arriving at a judgment about what the character should do in 
the situation. Follow-up questions and discussions explored participants’ answers in 
greater depth and included discussion of examples from their own lives. Some 
adjustments were made to questions following the first round of interviews as 
explained below (see Appendix K). Interviews lasted between 25 and 45 minutes 
and were audio-recorded. Each participant selected a pseudonym at the beginning 
of the interview to maintain their anonymity. Pseudonyms were used to refer to 
participants throughout data analysis and write-up. Participants were given the 
opportunity to read the transcript of their interview before their data was incorporated 
into the analysis (See Appendix L).  
Focus Groups 
All participants opted to attend a focus group following the individual interviews and 
initial phases of data analysis. Focus groups were used for theoretical sampling as 
part of on-going data analysis and ‘member-checking’ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 11). I 
shared an early model (see Appendix M) of the emerging theory with participants 
and sought their feedback. Taking into consideration that ‘…individuals in groups do 
not speak or answer questions in the same way as they do in other settings’ (Kidd & 
Parshall, 2000, p. 294), I held separate focus groups for Year 8 and Year 10 
participants. I also asked participants to discuss their ideas in smaller groups and 
write them down before feeding back to the group. This fed into subsequent stages 
of GT analysis, but also allowed participants to develop more ownership over the 
data and to begin to determine how it could best be used to serve their local practice 
context. We agreed to share the findings with the school’s Senior Leadership Team. 
Participants were debriefed following the focus group (see Appendix N). 
Ethical considerations are addressed in Chapter 2 (p.31). 
3.2.4 Data Analysis  
Data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously. I used NVivo 12 software to 
analyse my data, as recommended by Hutchison, Johnston, and Breckon (2010). I 
40 
 
followed Charmaz’s (2006) guidance on the GT process. Once I had conducted an 
interview, I began the process of line-by-line coding. Line by line analysis ensures 
codes are truly grounded within the data (Willig, 2013). Beginning the process of 
coding early, as well as writing memos (written analyses of developing ideas about 
codes), allowed me to gain insights about what kind of data to collect next (Charmaz, 
2006). As the research went on, I honed initial codes, developing more focused 
codes and making links between them. As a novice researcher, structure was 
important to help guide my analysis (Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, I used Corbin and 
Strauss’ (1990) Axial Codes and Glaser’s (1978) Theoretical Codes as a guide to 
inform my ideas about coding, though I did not adhere strictly to either.  
I was aware from the beginning that I had an active role in the grounded theory 
process and that my actions and interpretations influenced the path the research 
took and had a significant influence on the final theory. Charmaz (2006) argues it is 
not possible for the researcher to detach themselves from the research process and 
be an objective onlooker and therefore it is important to adopt a reflexive stance. 
Reflexivity helps the researcher to scrutinise themselves and their processes and to 
take care not to impose their own meanings on the data (Willig, 2013). I therefore 
defined my own views about character and wellbeing before commencing the 
research and kept in mind how these might influence the questions I was asking, the 
leads I was choosing to follow and my interpretations of the data. I used memo-
writing to interrogate my thinking throughout the data collection and analysis process 
and to record thoughts, questions and ideas. This led me to explore the data in 
different ways. At later stages of the analysis, I used axial and theoretical codes to 
stimulate my thinking in different directions, opening up new relationships within the 
data and generating new questions. I took the data back to the participants to seek 
their thoughts about the emerging theory and subsequently integrated the emerging 
theory with the existing literature. Table 7 offers a description of each component 
activity in the GT process. Figure 2 illustrates how data collection and data analysis 
procedures were interconnected throughout (see Appendix O for detailed overview 
of data analysis process). 
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Table 7 Grounded Theory process 
Activity Description 
Open coding Line by line, action-focused initial codes after each interview. 
Memo-writing Memos were started in the early stages of coding and continued 
throughout data collection and analysis. Later memos described 
and analysed categories and the relationships within and 
between them.   
Focused coding Similar open codes were merged and renamed. Continued 
memo-writing helped to focus codes. The process of revisiting, 
refining and focusing codes continued throughout data 
collection and analysis.  
Theoretical 
sampling 
Specific new data was sought focusing on emerging areas of 
interest throughout the data collection process. This entailed 
refining interview questions. 
Emerging 
Categories 
Began to merge and adapt existing codes to form categories. 
New categories emerged throughout the process through 
focused and theoretical coding. 
Refining 
Categories 
Emerging categories were gradually adapted and refined 
through continued coding and memo-writing. 
Theoretical 
coding 
Coding specified relationships between categories. 
Early grounding 
in literature 
Compared early theoretical codes with the literature. 
Early theory and 
model 
Created model of emerging theory to share with participants. 
Member 
checking 
Shared model with participants and sought their feedback. This 
led to another process of refining and memo-writing. Model and 
theory were adapted based on participants’ suggestions. 
Memo sorting Used mind-mapping and memo-writing to further explore links 
between categories and begin to put into an order. 
Integrating 
memos 
Analytical memos about the main categories were integrated 
with one another. This formed the basis of the theory. 
Grounding in 
literature 
Integrated relevant existing literature with emerging GT. 
Final Theory  Refined GT to produce final theory. 
 
42 
 
 Figure 2 Data collection and analysis procedure 
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3.3 Analysis 
3.3.1 Overview of analysis 
Participants all held clear personal understandings of what constitutes a good life and 
believed it was important to try and base their decisions on these understandings. 
Although they were often quite firm in their beliefs about what was good and right, 
their moral decisions did not always uphold their beliefs about the good, even in 
hypothetical scenarios. Young people described approaches to moral decision-
making which, although underpinned by a strong sense of the good, were responsive 
to the situational factors judged most salient in promoting positive outcomes for 
themselves and the people around them. Virtue understandings seemed to be 
activated and prioritised to differing degrees depending on the situation and the 
individual’s prior experiences. Participants seemed to weigh up the consequences of 
possible courses of action against competing personal and social priorities, placing a 
high weight on maintaining social relationships. These findings are discussed in 
further detail below. 
3.3.2 Activating relevant beliefs and understandings of the good 
Young people bring relevant personal beliefs about the good to their moral decision-
making. They generally reported having gained these beliefs through personal 
experience, either as a result of their upbringing, through group membership, or 
through exposure to wider societal norms. Many ideas expressed reflected common 
sayings such as ‘respect your elders’ or ‘treat others how you would like to be 
treated’ (e.g. Millie (p. 1, line 10): “if you’re nice to everyone else they’re gonna be 
nice to you”) as informing their understanding of the good. This reinforces Aho’s 
(2012, p. 44) assertion that ‘The community…provides a cohesive and stable 
narrative that guides the individual member toward communally accepted values’. 
Participants highly valued honesty, respect, fairness, kindness and responsibility, 
with some expressing these as non-negotiable regardless of the situation, especially 
honesty. Rory (p. 5, line 17) believed it would be easier for someone to uphold these 
virtues in their actions, “if they…know who they are and they know what they believe 
in”. Billie (p. 3, line 33) similarly expressed how important it is that our actions reflect 
our beliefs because, “that’s what you base yourself on”. This suggests they saw 
virtue as central to their sense of self. Moral identity theory (Blasi, 1984) states that 
the more strongly an individual sees moral concerns as being central to who they are 
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as a person, the more likely they are to uphold their beliefs about what is right, even 
when situational factors might make this more difficult (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Passini, 
2016). Moral identity is judged by some psychologists to be an important component 
of character (Berkowitz, 2012; Nucci, 2017) and to provide a distinguishing feature 
from other forms of Moral Education by focusing on the question ‘who will I be?’ 
rather than ‘what should I do?’ (McGrath, 2017, p. 28).  
However, the concept of moral identity has been criticised for not predicting under 
which circumstances a particular identity will be experienced (S. Hardy & G. Carlo, 
2005). Sonnentag and Barnett (2015) found that although they expected individuals 
with a strong moral identity to take a stand against actions that would compromise 
their values, they found this was not the case in the context of their research. 
Similarly, in the current research, although many participants saw honesty as central 
to themselves, there were hypothetical and real-life situations where they would be 
prepared to compromise honesty. For example, Alex (p. 4, line 19) expressed the 
belief that, “the morally right thing would be to be honest, like no matter what had 
happened”. However, his opinion in one of the hypothetical scenarios differed from 
this: “she’s been through some stuff at home and they’re close friends…so they 
would wanna help her out. And if it’s by lying, then I think they would be willing to 
take the risk” (p. 5, line 10). This reinforces Nucci (2017) and Lerner and Callina’s 
(2014) view that the exercise of character changes in response to the situation and is 
therefore not reducible to moral identity alone.    
Young people did not consistently use the language of virtue when describing their 
understandings of the good. When presented with a list of virtues, many said they did 
not know what ‘humility’ and ‘integrity’ meant, despite these appearing in the school’s 
core values. In some of their descriptions of decision-making, they referred to specific 
actions rather than using the language of virtue. For example, they spoke about 
“tell(ing) the truth” (Riley, p. 5, line 27) rather than ‘honesty’ or “helping [people]” 
(Phoenix, p. 2, line 39) rather than ‘compassion’. The good was defined through 
descriptions of concrete behaviours rather than abstract terms and definitions whose 
meanings could be transferable in context. This lends support to social cognitive 
conceptualisations of virtues as schemas that guide us in our deliberations but whose 
application varies across situations (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; 
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). As Alzola (2012) argued, the behaviours we classify in a 
given schema can change and expand as we develop experience and therefore each 
45 
 
individual’s schema of a particular virtue will be specific to their own knowledge and 
experience. If this is true, there cannot be a strict set of behaviours we must adhere 
to in order to be called virtuous. 
The salience of virtues seems to vary for young people depending on whether and 
how they are activated. Most participants did not believe they deliberated about all 
moral decisions. Two possible explanations seemed to emerge as to what happens 
to virtue in this scenario: either it is so well-embedded it becomes intuitive, or factors 
other than virtue determine their response to a situation. Participants believed there 
were some situations in which they “just know” (Riley, p. 4, line 6) what to do without 
having to think about it. For example, when Bob (p. 4, line 17) saw someone being 
bullied, she did not stop to think about whether to get involved or not: “I didn’t even 
think what was gonna happen, I just said, ‘look, stop. It’s not the right thing to do’.” 
This lends support to Narvaez’s (2018) suggestion that some virtues are so well-
established that we know the virtuous thing to do without thinking about it. This was a 
situation Bob had encountered before and something she felt passionately about. 
Such automatic responses have been likened to the Aristotelian concept of habits 
(Lapsley & Hill, 2008; Narvaez & Bock, 2014; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 
2006), which may or may not be activated in a given situation (Aquino et al., 2009).  
Although young people’s intuitive responses often uphold what they believe to be 
good, this may not always be the case. Participants described “getting carried away” 
(Jesse, p. 3, line 7) and doing or saying things they might “regret” (Riley, p. 2, line 21) 
when they have subsequently thought about it. In these scenarios, beliefs about the 
good may not be driving their response. Young people believed they did not always 
perceive the need for conscious deliberation when in the moment. The Year 8 focus 
group (p. 5, lines 12-24) saw reacting before taking time to consider all their options 
as being more common for young people than for adults. This is perhaps because 
they are more likely to encounter novel situations that require conscious deliberation 
and less likely to have mature moral schemas in place, therefore increasing their 
reliance on intuitive responses to dilemmas (Albert & Steinberg, 2011; Narvaez & 
Bock, 2014). As a person develops in virtue, they develop more awareness of 
potential biases (Bourgeault, 2003) and an increasing ability to switch between 
control and automaticity in action as needed (Koutstaal, 2013). This suggests that 
providing opportunities to practice conscious deliberation about the good could help 
develop participants’ intuitive responses, reducing the processing demands placed 
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on them in the moment and developing their ability to discern when conscious 
deliberation is likely to be needed. 
3.3.3 Weighing consequences against competing personal and social priorities 
When conscious deliberation was employed, young people were able to consider the 
potential outcomes of different courses of action and whether these outcomes upheld 
their understanding of the good. Similarly, Dewey’s (1908/2009) concept of creative 
moral imagination states that when we have a moral decision to make we imagine 
the possible courses of action and their consequences to help us decide what to do 
(Narvaez & Mrkva, 2014). This is particularly difficult in situations where the best 
course of action is not immediately obvious because different ‘fields’ (De Caro et al., 
2018, p. 294) of virtue conflict. For example, Rory (p. 3) described a situation where 
her friend had done something she judged to be wrong. She had to make a difficult 
choice between being fair to the victim by telling an adult what had happened or 
keeping what she knew to herself out of loyalty to her friend. In the end she decided 
that although her friend might be upset with her in the short-term, “if I let her get away 
with it, it won’t be fair on the other person, it won’t be fair on [the friend] when she 
grows up” (p. 3, line 36). Rory made a judgment about which consequences would 
best uphold her personal understanding of the good. 
Looking beyond immediate consequences was often helpful in allowing participants 
to arrive at judgments that created a satisfactory integration of their competing beliefs 
about the good, rather than forcing them to select one over the other. For example, in 
one dilemma, young people had to weigh loyalty, compassion and honesty. The 
dilemma asked whether Dan should tell his friend, Sarah, the truth when she asked 
what he thought of her terrible singing. Many acknowledged a potential conflict here: 
“I wouldn’t wanna say it was horrible cos then you’d hurt her feelings but then it’s 
hard cos I wouldn’t wanna give her false hope” (Ellis, p. 6, line 28). Most people felt 
that even though it may hurt Sarah’s feelings in the beginning to hear that she is not 
good at singing, long-term it is better to hear this from a trusted friend. This belief in 
the importance of honesty between friends was held very strongly by almost all 
participants. Most believed Dan should tell Sarah the truth because then, “she knows 
for next time she might need to improve” (Jordan, p. 2, line 33) and because, “if he 
lies and then she goes and performs in front of people, that will be more 
embarrassing for her” (Sam, p. 6, line 27). Some young people’s responses also 
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incorporated their concern for compassion towards Sarah. For example, Millie (p. 6, 
line 10) said it was important to, “think of the best way…to tell the truth” to let Sarah 
down gently. These examples show evidence of young people’s ability to consider a 
wide range of possible actions and their outcomes and find a way to uphold what 
they believe to be good. Participants’ responses integrated their understandings from 
separate fields of virtue into the action that produced the most satisfactory overall 
outcome to the situation. Rather than conceiving of each virtue as separate, which 
risks ‘generating conflicting commitments for the agent’ (De Caro et al., 2018, p. 
292), they reasoned with complexity and sought opportunities to uphold multiple 
virtue fields, or virtue schemas, at once. Narvaez (2010) cites this as a marker of 
ethical expertise. 
Young people highlighted the importance of being able to anticipate how their actions 
may be perceived by another person. The Year 8 focus group (p. 2, lines 12-33) 
believed it is often difficult to anticipate how another person will react to their actions 
and that responses to the same action could differ widely between people, making 
consequences even more difficult to anticipate. This makes the task of the moral 
decision-maker even more difficult. Not only must young people recognise that their 
actions, “don’t just affect themselves” (Morgan, p. 3, line 1). They must also try to 
anticipate how the other person will react because, “you may think that something’s 
fair when it probably isn’t fair if you look at it from somebody else’s point of view” 
(Charlie, p. 4, line 24). This ability to take the perspective of another person has been 
highlighted as a key skill in models of character (Nucci, 2017) and moral decision-
making (Garrigan et al., 2018; Gibbs, 2014). Perspective-taking ability continues to 
develop into late adolescence (Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010) and 
is therefore something young people may continue to require support with.  
Often, in taking the perspective of another person, participants considered how their 
actions impacted on the feelings of others. Emotion is highlighted as key to ethical 
decision-making (Narvaez & Mrkva, 2014) and practical wisdom (Darnell et al., 2019) 
and was a component part of virtue for Aristotle (2009). Many participants said they 
would not want to do anything that might “hurt” the feelings of another person. Not 
only can emotions help weigh consequences, they can also prime young people to 
either increase or decrease the severity of their moral judgments (Schnall et al., 
2008; Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010). The Year 10 focus group described 
“emotional block-down” (p. 1, line 2) as predisposing them to more severe 
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judgments. This denoted times when an emotional experience earlier in the day 
affected their willingness to engage with subsequent situations as well as they felt 
they should.  
Social influences were also salient in young people’s responses to dilemmas. 
Consistent with research highlighting the key role parents play in helping children 
internalise and develop moral thoughts, feelings and actions (Kochanska, 2002; 
Narvaez & Lapsley, 2014), most young people believed their current understanding 
of the good came from their upbringing. Ellis (p. 8, line 37) said, “I, yeah, stick to what 
my parents have taught me”. However, young people perceived a shift in the role 
parents played in supporting their moral decision-making as they got older. They 
believed their parents could still offer them advice: older people “know more 
sometimes” (Sky, p. 6, line 5). But the most significant source of support in moral 
decision-making was reported to come from peers, particularly for some Year 10 
participants: “When I was little it’d have been at home, but I think now everything I 
learn about being myself is from my friends because I see them every day” (Riley, p. 
9, line 1). This is reflective of a general developmental shift of reference in 
adolescence from parents to peers (American Psychological Association, 2002). 
Through identifying with their peers, adolescents begin to develop their own moral 
understandings (Bishop & Inderbitzen, 1995). Young people believed when an 
individual’s views match that of their social group, “it’ll encourage (them) to do the 
right thing” (Charlie, p. 2, line 5). If the young person does not have relevant 
experience to draw on, they might look to their peer group, “cos I’ve seen other 
people in situations and I guess like I’ve just learned from them” (Elena, p. 6, line 20). 
Sometimes, if young people have a strong belief that contradicts that of the group, 
they might look to peers for emotional support and reassurance: “if you just keep it all 
inside and don’t tell anyone about it, it multiplies your problems ten times more” (Ellis, 
p. 3, line 25). They valued being able to talk through a problem with their peers. 
Robyn (p. 9, line 30) believed she would be more likely to seek support in moral 
decision-making from her friends than from teachers because “friends teach things 
better than teachers”.   
Participants also placed a high level of importance on choosing friends well: “I know 
they can help me make sure I’m making the right choices” (Millie, p.2, line 37). 
Aristotle (2009) highlighted friendship as important for developing virtue; friendships 
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based on virtue are mutually beneficial with friends acting for the good of the other. 
Loyalty between friends was held in extremely high regard by many of the young 
people, with many participants expressing willingness to, “take one for the team” 
(Jamie, p. 6, line 4) and take the blame for something they had not done in order to 
protect a friend. It seems that peer support networks can be especially helpful to 
young people both in developing their beliefs about the good and enacting them. 
Consistent with Phillip and Spratt’s (2007) findings in relation to peer mentoring that 
young people prefer informal peer support to more formal adult-led support, peer-to-
peer support may offer a more powerful means of developing practical wisdom.  
Conversely, peer groups can place pressure on the individual to conform, either 
through the threat of being called names or being accused of “chickening out” (Ellis, 
p. 1, line 22). Sometimes young people wish to belong to a certain group to “boost 
their ego…and make them feel like they’re cool” (Ash, p. 2, line 12). Bob (p. 5, line 
13) had experienced finding herself in the wrong crowd and warned that, “the hardest 
thing is trying to work your way back out of that crowd”. This is consistent with 
existing research into the significant role of group norms in moral behaviour (Haidt, 
2001; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2015). Mulvey and Killen (2015) found their participants 
knew bullying to be wrong and expressed concern for the victim but did not want to 
become the victim themselves by going against the group. Similarly, participants in 
the current research described feeling conflicted in situations where their peer group 
was bullying somebody. Most participants said that they would “try to help” (Ellis, p. 
1, line 15) and “stick[ing] up for other people” (Elena, p. 3, line 24).  However, there 
was also acknowledgement that the situation they find themselves in can sometimes 
make this difficult. Pressures to conform can overpower some individuals (Sonnentag 
& Barnett, 2015). It is possible to get sucked in to group norms and this seemed to 
link to young people’s sense of identity. Bob (p. 5, line 35) warns it may be much 
later that the individual realises, “this isn’t the person I want to be”.  
There was a perception that there is a qualitative difference in experience between 
being directly involved in a situation and being “say like an onlooker” (Alex, p. 5, line 
6). Young people perceived it easier to uphold their beliefs if not directly engaged in 
the immediate situation. “If you’re in the moment, you’re going to react with instinct 
and not think as clearly as if you had more time” (Year 8 focus group, p. 2, line 35). 
Riley (p. 3, line 9) seemed to use a strategy which turned her into an onlooker and 
allowed her to gain some distance from the situation: “you should think about in five 
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to ten years if you look back…and think “…Did I choose just to be friends with the 
person and go against what I should have done?”. Sometimes it is not until after a 
decision has been made that young people are able to find this distance: “it still feels 
like the right thing at the time till you look back on it and you realise” (Alex, p. 5, line 
1). This highlights the importance for young people of having space and time to 
reflect on their actions. Reflection is an important component of moral decision-
making as it informs our personal experiences and understandings of virtue and can 
help determine future action (Crossan et al., 2013).  
3.3.4 Conclusion 
The findings offer an exploration of some of the complexities involved in integrating 
personal understandings of the good with the demands of the situation. Young 
people hold beliefs about the good, which they have acquired through their 
experiences throughout their upbringing: from their parents, from people in their 
social circles and from wider societal expectations. They are constantly adding to and 
adapting their virtue schemas. The extent to which these beliefs about the good are 
activated and enacted when making ethical decisions depends on a range of 
interconnected situational variables, the most significant of which seems to be social 
influences. Social influences can be a source of support or pressure for young people 
in their moral decision-making, depending on the context. Often it is helpful for young 
people to have others to guide or reinforce beliefs about the good, particularly in 
situations they have not encountered before. However, it is difficult to hold and act on 
beliefs that are different to those of the group. Maintaining relationships and 
particularly upholding friendships is particularly important to young people and 
decisions that affect those they are close to can be more difficult if they have to go 
against a personal belief about the good in order to protect someone they care about. 
Even within seemingly simple decisions, there is evidence of a wide range of 
interacting personal and situational factors that are unlikely to be configured in the 
same way in any two situations. The ability to skilfully discern the relevant factors in a 
situation and integrate them with personal beliefs about the good whilst respecting 
others’ beliefs about the good is a complex process which seems to vary according 
to the presenting dilemma and the individual approach of each participant.  
The findings support a social-cognitive view of character development, which rejects 
a trait notion of virtue and emphasises the importance of the interaction between 
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person and context. This suggests the focus of Character Education should be on 
developing young people’s ability to flexibly apply understandings of what is right and 
good according to the unique features of a given situation. This idea can be found in 
the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom. The findings do not offer a set of 
components of practical wisdom or a list of the situational factors that should be 
considered in every situation. They highlight the complexity of thought behind moral 
decisions in a way quantitative tests of moral decision-making cannot capture. They 
also demonstrate young people’s ability to reflect on situations in depth and to 
integrate a wide range of considerations into their moral decision-making, as well as 
offering some insight into the personal and situational factors that may weigh into 
young people’s moral decision-making.  
3.3.5 Limitations 
A common criticism of moral dilemma research is that responses to hypothetical 
moral dilemmas do not always predict real-world decision-making (Graham, Meindl, 
& Beall, 2012). These scenarios conceptualise moral decisions as an end product, 
whereas in real life behaviour tends to be the end product (Krebs & Denton, 2005). 
Although technological advances are making it easier to observe moral decision-
making in naturally-occurring social contexts (Mehl & Conner, 2012), this also has 
limitations as participants often do not have time to reflect in the level of detail 
required to fully explore their decision-making processes. To address this issue, 
some researchers have favoured asking participants to reflect on moral decisions 
they have recently made in their own lives (B. Marshall & Dewe, 1997). By asking 
participants to complete the questionnaires at the beginning of the research, I 
attempted to make the hypothetical dilemmas as relevant as possible to decisions 
participants might face in real life. The hypothetical scenarios proved useful as a 
stimulus for discussion, with participants relating them to similar scenarios in their 
own lives. However, an important limitation of the current findings is that participants’ 
responses to the hypothetical scenarios presented may not reflect the way they 
would respond to a similar situation in their own lives.  
Whilst the research considered the interaction between person and context, it did not 
consider how these interactions are affected by the nature of the dilemma being 
posed. Krebs and Denton (2005) outline four different types of moral dilemma: 
philosophical, antisocial, social pressure and prosocial dilemmas, each of which 
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make different cognitive and affective demands on the decision-maker. It is probable 
that given different kinds of dilemma, different interactions between person and 
situation may have emerged. 
Further limitations relate to the extent to which it may be possible to generalise these 
findings beyond the current setting. The research took place in a school which had 
an established approach to Character Education. This meant students were used to 
reflecting on the good and the ways in which they applied virtues to their own lives. It 
is possible that students in a setting which does not focus on character development 
may not have been able to articulate their understandings of the good so clearly or to 
demonstrate the same level of flexibility in adapting their understanding of the good 
to match the requirements of the situation.  
Added to this, it is important to recognise the limits of a subjective method such as 
Grounded Theory in producing data that can be generalised (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990). As Willig (2013, p. 78) argues ‘all observations are made from a particular 
perspective’ and therefore to some extent depend on what the researcher is looking 
for. If another researcher were to undertake this study, it is likely their data collection 
and analysis would have looked quite different. This account offers one construction 
among countless other possible interpretations of the process of young people’s 
moral decision-making.  
3.3.6 Implications for research and practice 
Directions for practice 
Although care should be taken when generalising from the findings of grounded 
theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Willig, 2013), many of the findings are supported by 
existing literature and thus may be reasonably thought to have some degree of 
applicability beyond this research sample. The findings suggest some possible 
avenues for future practice in CE. 
Social cognitive theories of character which draw parallels between the Aristotelian 
concepts of virtue and practical wisdom and the psychological concept of ethical 
expertise (De Caro et al., 2018; Narvaez & Bock, 2014) seem to offer a promising 
theoretical underpinning of CE. The findings suggest CE programmes should focus 
not on habituation to individual virtues, but on training overall ethical expertise, as 
has previously been argued by Lapsley (2019). Narvaez (2008) states it is important 
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to develop both intuitive and deliberative processing in becoming an ethical expert. 
The intuitive and deliberative operations underpinning ethical expertise can be 
developed both through exposure to experience and through training deliberative 
operations, which are gradually internalised until they become intuitive responses 
(Dansereau, Knight, & Flynn, 2013; Knight, Dansereau, Becan, Rowan, & Flynn, 
2015). Educational psychologists could play a key role in supporting teachers to 
design CE curricula which provide the first-hand experiences of decision-making 
needed to help young people develop both intuitive and deliberative processing. 
Explicit opportunities to reflect on deliberative processing may be particularly 
important in helping young people to develop the analytical processes needed to 
apply their understanding of the good effectively within novel situations (Knight et al., 
2015).  
If educators are to scaffold opportunities for young people to develop ethical 
expertise, it is important they understand its theoretical underpinnings. They should 
seek to create opportunities for students to generate their own understandings of the 
good and reflect on their own decision-making processes, rather than attempting to 
enforce a moral code through proceduralised, behaviourist approaches. Educational 
psychologists are well-placed to support teaching staff in understanding the 
theoretical underpinnings of the construct of character and in exploring its application 
to the curriculum. Supporting educators to develop effective CE programmes could 
offer a salutogenic approach to promoting wellbeing in schools. Such an approach 
emphasises the importance of taking active steps to help young people flourish, 
rather than addressing difficulties once these have arisen.  
Educational psychologists could support schools to develop proactive approaches to 
character development, and thus wellbeing, by giving young people opportunities to 
discuss moral dilemmas either before or as they arise, rather than evaluating 
decisions that have already been taken, as might be the case with restorative 
conferences, for example. Similar to restorative conferences, schools could use 
preventative ‘character conferences’ as a way of supporting young people to 
consider how they might act if they were to be faced with a particular moral dilemma 
prior to being placed in that situation. Rather than discussing a situation in an attempt 
to restore relationships once somebody has been wronged, character conferences 
could offer an opportunity for young people to determine how to bring about the best 
consequences for themselves and others before they act. ‘Character conferences’ 
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could serve as safe spaces for young people to bring moral dilemmas they are 
currently facing, giving them the opportunity to explore the situation and how different 
possible courses of action may sit with their understanding of the good.  
As well as suggesting the potential power in salutogenic approaches to the promotion 
of eudaimonic wellbeing in schools, the findings also highlight the important role 
peers could play in promoting one-another’s wellbeing. The findings suggest young 
people may be more likely to turn to their friends for support when faced with a moral 
dilemma than they would be to turn to an adult. Opportunities for reflection on real-life 
experiences with a trusted peer may be an effective means of encouraging young 
people to reflect on their decision-making and promoting deliberative thinking skills 
focused on issues that are pertinent to young people, rather than having discussion 
topics imposed by adults, who often have different priorities (Arthur, Kristjánsson, et 
al., 2017).Therefore, helping students to develop the skills to support one-another 
through conducting their own ‘character conferences’ may present a meaningful and 
effective way of developing a salutogenic approach to the promotion of wellbeing 
within schools.  
Directions for future research 
The findings offer evidence that young people adapt their ethical responses 
according to the situation. The current research has started to outline some of the 
situational factors salient to young people in their moral decision-making. However, 
the current sample size was small and limited to one school context which may not 
be reflective of the general population. Further research is needed to continue to 
outline the key situational factors that influence young people’s decision-making in 
different contexts and among different age groups.  
Existing CE research seems to focus on how young people respond to adult-directed 
and implemented programmes. However, evidence from this research highlights that 
young people will often seek support from their peers in their real-time decision-
making. Further research is needed to explore how peer-to-peer support could 
influence young people’s decisions about the good. 
Research suggests first-hand experience helps young people to develop intuitive and 
deliberative virtue schemas (Dansereau et al., 2013; Knight et al., 2015). However, 
many CE programmes seem to be based on second-hand analysis of the actions of 
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others, for example literary protagonists (Arthur, Harrison, Carr, et al., 2014; Pike et 
al., 2015; Seroczynski et al., 2011) or historical figures (Long, 2014; Seider et al., 
2013). Further research is needed into the potential of more practical, experiential 
programmes, such as Billig et al.’s (2008) Service Learning programme, in supporting 
the development of character. 
3.3.7 Summary 
This qualitative exploration of young people’s decision-making highlights the 
complexity inherent in upholding beliefs about the good whilst also determining the 
best course of action according to the situation. The young people in this research 
demonstrated sensitivity to these complexities and were able to integrate their 
understandings of the good with salient situational factors to bring about what they 
judged to be the best consequences for themselves and others. The findings show 
the importance of helping students to develop the practical wisdom to integrate 
virtues and situational factors in promoting the best outcomes for themselves and 
others, which fits with a Pragmatist understanding of wellbeing. Overall, the research 
suggests that a social cognitive approach to Character Education, which emphasises 
the importance of building ethical expertise through opportunities to practise 
autonomous moral decision-making in a range of situations, offers a promising 
empirical approach to the promotion of eudaimonic wellbeing in schools.   
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Appendices  
Appendix A Electronic database search terms and results 
ERIC EBSCO  
Search Terms 
Character education Adolescent Phronesis 
“Character education” DE “adolescents” 
DE “Middle school 
students” 
DE “Early adolescents” 
DE “High school students” 
DE “Junior high school 
students” 
DE “Secondary school 
students” 
DE “Moral development” 
DE “Moral values” 
Virtue* 
 “Practical wisdom” 
Moral reasoning 
Moral judgement 
Character  
Phronesis 
Record of reasons for choice of terms: 
• Thesaurus says Character education = DE Values Education but the 
searches that came back were not relevant so I completed a basic 
search for “Character Education”.  
• Did not use DE personality because the literature states that character is 
less fixed than personality. 
• No need to input two spellings of judgment as search picked up both.  
• Virtue, Character and Practical wisdom are not in the Thesaurus.  
• DE Moral Values = Principles and standards which determine the extent 
to which human action or conduct is right or wrong. 
• DE Moral Development = Developmental processes in the formation of 
moral reasoning and judgments. 
 
Search results  
1. “character education” (1,137)  
2. DE “adolescents” (47,142)  
3. DE “Middle School Students” (11,850)  
4. DE “Early Adolescents” (3,325)  
5. DE “High School Students” (30,470) 
6. DE “Junior High School Students” (5,324) 
7. DE “Secondary School Students” (16,556)  
8. S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 (103,317)  
9. DE “Moral Development” (4,554) 
10. DE “Moral Values” (8,663) 
11. Virtue* (2,094)  
12. “practical wisdom” (153) 
13. Moral reasoning (1,227) 
14. Moral judgment (1,039)  
15. Character (14,818)  
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16. Phronesis (102)  
17. S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 OR S14 OR S15 OR S16 (27, 232) 
18. S1 AND S8 AND S17 (115)  
19. S18 LIMIT TO 2007-2017 (48)  
20. LIMIT TO NOT “ELEMENTARY SCHOOL” (43)  
21. NOT “SCHOOL SUSPENSION” (41)  
 
 
British Education Index EBSCO  
Search Terms 
Character education adolescent Phronesis 
“character education” 
 
DE “teenagers” or de 
“adolescence” 
DE “middle school 
students” 
DE “high school students” 
DE “junior high school 
students” 
DE “secondary school 
students” 
DE “high school juniors” 
“moral values” 
“moral development” 
virtue* 
“practical wisdom” 
“moral reasoning” 
“moral judgement” or 
“moral judgment” 
character 
phronesis 
Reasons for choice of terms: 
• No “Character Education” in DE. 
• No “Moral Development” and no “Moral Values” in thesaurus.  
• Added DE “high school juniors”  
• DE teenagers or DE adolescence = both for adolescent and therefore on 
same row. 
• DE “Early Adolescents” not in thesaurus.  
 
Search Results 
1. “Character education” (205) 
2. DE “teenagers” OR DE “adolescence” (7,053) 
3. DE “Middle school students” (462) 
4. DE “High school students” (317) 
5. DE “Junior high school students” (13) 
6. DE “Secondary school students” (6,065) 
7. DE “High school juniors” (16) 
8. S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 (13,253) 
9. “Moral values” (74) 
10. “Moral development” (696) 
11. Virtue* (370) 
12. “Practical wisdom” (47) 
13. “Moral reasoning” (133) 
14. “Moral judgement” OR “moral judgment” (98) 
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15. Character (1,591) 
16. Phronesis (52) 
17. S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 OR S14 OR S15 OR S16 (2,731) 
18. S1 AND S8 AND S17 (44) 
 
PsycInfo (Ovid) 
Search Terms 
Character education adolescent Phronesis 
“character education” 
 
 
teenagers.mp 
adolescen*.mp 
exp. middle school 
students 
high school students 
junior high school 
students 
secondary school 
students.mp 
 
 
moral development 
“moral values”.mp 
exp. virtue 
“practical wisdom”.mp 
“moral reasoning”.mp 
“moral judgement”.mp 
“moral judgment”.mp 
character.mp 
phronesis.mp 
 
Reasons for choice of terms: 
• Controlled vocabulary suggests Personality development or moral 
development but this is not “Character Education”. 
• Neither “teenagers”, “adolescen*”, “secondary school students” nor “high 
school juniors” were in the controlled vocabulary. 
• “Moral development” and “virtue” were the only terms for phronesis in the 
controlled vocabulary. 
 
Search Results 
1. “Character education”.mp (432) 
2. Teenagers.mp (5,079) 
3. Adolescen*.mp (148,159) 
4. Exp. Middle school students (5,747) 
5. High school students (10,816) 
6. Junior high school students (953) 
7. Secondary school students.mp (2,380) 
8. 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 (162,409) 
9. Moral development (2,010) 
10. Moral values.mp (777) 
11. Exp. Virtue (1,134) 
12. “Practical wisdom”.mp (296) 
13. Moral reasoning.mp (1,392) 
14. Moral judgement.mp (191) 
15. moral judgment.mp (1,545) 
16. Character.mp (17,578) 
17. Phronesis.mp (176) 
18. 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 (23215) 
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19. 1 and 8 and 18 (77) 
20. Limit to 2007-2017 = (53) 
 
Scopus  
Search Terms 
Character education adolescent Phronesis 
“character education” 
 
 
teenage* 
adolescen* 
“high school juniors” 
“high school students” 
“secondary school 
students” 
“junior high school 
students” 
“middle school students” 
 
“moral development” 
“moral values” 
virtue* 
“practical wisdom” 
“moral reasoning” 
“moral judgment” 
character 
phronesis 
 
 
Reasons for choice of terms: 
• Spelling “moral judgment” or “moral judgement” yielded same results. 
 
Search Results 
1. Character education (539) 
2. Teenage* (32,705) 
3. Adolescen* (2,132, 640) 
4. “High school junior” (237) 
5. “High school student” (26,215) 
6. “Secondary school student” (6,112) 
7.  “Junior high school student” (1,981) 
8.  “Middle school student” (5,548) 
9. 2  8 OR  (2,164,089) 
10. “moral development” (3,330) 
11. “moral values” (3,139) 
12. Virtue* (58,948) 
13. “practical wisdom” (709) 
14. “moral reasoning” (2648) 
15. “moral judgment” (4388) 
16. Character (493,005) 
17. Phronesis (661) 
18. 10  17 OR (561,230) 
19. 1 AND 9 AND 19 (40) 
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Appendix B Weight of Evidence      
Study 
 
 
Arthur, et al. 
(2017) 
Billig et al. 
(2008) 
Long (2014) Pike et al. 
(2015) 
Seider et al. 
(2013) 
Seroczynski et al. 
(2011) 
1. Are there ethical 
concerns about the 
way the study was 
done? 
 
Yes: Possible 
vested interest of 
researchers – all 
from JCCV. 
Yes: study was opt-
out, parental consent 
assumed. Funding: 
CE grant given to 
schools. 
No  Yes- Researchers 
hoping to secure 
funding to extend 
project. 
Yes- study was opt-
out, parental consent 
assumed. 
Participants received 
financial reward. 
Yes- selective sampling 
based on potential for 
success. Pressure to 
participate to be able to 
leave programme? 
 
2. Were students 
and/or parents 
appropriately 
involved in the 
design or conduct 
of the study? 
No  No No  No  No  No. 
3. Is there sufficient 
justification for why 
the study was done 
the way it was? 
 
 
Yes: to outline 
different 
approaches to CE 
and to consider 
teacher and 
student reports 
on effectiveness. 
Yes: to evaluate the 
3-year programme, 
using pre- and post-
test measures of 
aspects of character 
development. But 
theoretical basis not 
clear. 
 
No: mixed 
theoretical 
underpinnings, 
unclear rationale 
for study design 
and for CE 
intervention. 
Yes: to explore 
the effect of the 
Narnian Virtues 
programme on 
virtue 
development. 
Yes: to compare 
effects of emphasising 
moral or performance 
character development 
on character-related 
outcomes. 
 
Yes: to explore the 
effect of the literature-
based CE programme 
on the development of 
virtues. 
4. Was the choice of 
research design 
appropriate for 
addressing the 
research 
question(s) posed? 
 
 
Yes: Case study, 
mixed methods. 
Attempts to 
triangulate quant. 
and qual. 
Methods. 
Yes: Quasi-
experimental design. 
Matched controls.  
Yes to an extent – 
Quasi-
experimental 
design. Short time-
frame of 
intervention. 
Yes, mostly: 
Quasi-
experimental 
within subjects 
design. Pre/post-
test measures. 
Personality 
measure used as 
control.  
 
Yes: Quasi-
experimental design 
allowed comparison of 
2 interventions but no 
control group. 
No: Quasi-
experimental. 
Allocation of 
participants to 
‘engaged’ or 
‘disengaged’ condition 
= arbitrary.  
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Study 
 
 
Arthur, et al. 
(2017) 
Billig et al. 
(2008) 
Long (2014) Pike et al. 
(2015) 
Seider et al. 
(2013) 
Seroczynski et al. 
(2011) 
5. Have sufficient 
attempts been made 
to establish the 
repeatability or 
reliability of data 
collection methods 
or tools?  
 
 
Yes, some 
attempt:  
Used 
questionnaires for 
quant. Both 
replicable. No 
mention of 
reliability. Qual. 
methods – semi-
structured 
interviews not 
easily replicable.  
 
 
Repeatability, no: 
Content and origin of 
surveys not clear 
from info provided. 
Reliability – yes: 
tested internal 
consistency of 
survey items. 
Reliant on self-
report. 
Yes good: clear 
pre/post-test 
procedure. 
Repeatable scale 
used. Cites 
previous studies on 
reliability of CEG. 
Reliant on self-
report. 
 
 
 
 
Yes, some 
attempt: Q’aire 1- 
tested reliability of 
items using 
Cronbach’s alpha. 
But reliant on self-
report. Reliability 
of Q’aire 2 not 
addressed. 
Yes, some attempt: 
Used previously-
established scales. 
Tested internal 
consistency of scale 
items using 
Cronbach’s alpha. But 
reliant on self-report 
and Time 2 scores 
lower than Time 1 for 
both groups.  
Yes, some attempt: 
used SRM-SF. Cites 
previous research 
showing good 
reliability. 
Used both teachers’ 
and students’ virtues 
ratings. No significant 
differences found 
between groups on: 
family size, family 
income, age. 
 
6. Have sufficient 
attempts been made 
to establish the 
validity or 
trustworthiness of 
data collection tools 
and methods? 
  
 
 
Yes, some: 
Validity – Ad-ICM 
previously 
validated by 
Thoma et al. 
(2013) then 
adapted for use in 
the UK by Walker 
et al. (2017).  
Moral self-
relevance 
measure – no 
mention of 
validity.  
Choice of 
interview 
questions not 
clear. 
Yes, some: pilot of 
survey items 
included factor 
analysis – items with 
high loadings 
retained.  
Matched control 
groups - no more 
than 10% variation 
on demographics 
found.  
 
 
No: unclear why 
CEG (Narvaez et 
al., 2008) chosen 
as outcome 
measure but pilot 
studies used to 
establish its 
validity. 
 
 
Yes, some: in 
subsequent 
publication, 
Francis et al. 
(2018) map virtues 
onto Eysenck’s 
personality 
characteristics.  
Not clear how 
Q’aire 2 was 
developed or how 
it was analysed.  
 
 
 
Yes, some: Chi 
square tests  no 
significant differences 
across schools in: 
gender, attainment, 
attrition. Community 
Connectedness 
predicted by group not 
condition (p<0.0001). 
Authors highlight 
scales may not be 
specific enough to 
assess Ethical Identity, 
Courage and 
Responsibility. 
 
Yes, some attempt: 
Factor analysis of VYS 
and tests of internal 
consistency using 
Cronbach’s alpha.  
SRM-SF – reliability 
tests cited. 
Used both teachers’ 
and students' virtues 
ratings.  Teacher inter-
rater reliability 
 
Compared engaged 
and disengaged groups 
on family income, 
family size and age. No 
significant differences 
found.   
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Study 
 
 
Arthur, et al. 
(2017) 
Billig et al. 
(2008) 
Long (2014) Pike et al. 
(2015) 
Seider et al. 
(2013) 
Seroczynski et al. 
(2011) 
7. Have sufficient 
attempts been made 
to establish the 
repeatability or 
reliability of data 
analysis? 
 
 
No: qual. analysis 
methods not 
clear. 
Comparison of 
Ad-ICM averages 
not reliable.  
Yes:  t-tests 
comparisons of post-
test survey 
experimental and 
control group scores. 
Triangulation with 
other sources (not 
detailed in this 
paper). 
Yes: paired 
samples t-tests 
comparing the 
mean pre/post-test 
scores.  
Yes, partly: Q’aire 
1 used t-tests for 
within subjects 
pre/post-test 
comparison. But 
for Q’aire 2 
compared mean 
scores - no 
statistical test. 
Yes, some: Multi-level 
regression models 
used for each of the 6 
measures. 
Yes, some: 2x2 
ANOVAs used to 
compare groups pre-
/post-test. Checked for 
correlations between 
virtues scale and SRM-
SF 
8. Have sufficient 
attempts been made 
to establish the 
validity or 
trustworthiness of 
data analysis? 
No: very little 
formal data 
analysis. 
Yes, some: Used 
multivariate analysis 
to determine factors 
that may have 
moderated impact. P 
values calculated to 
determine statistical 
significance. 
 
Yes, some: P 
values calculated 
to determine 
statistical 
significance of 
changes to CEG 
Scale scores. 
 
Yes, some: P 
values used to 
determine 
statistical 
significance for 
Q’aire 1. Within 
subjects controls. 
Sufficient data to 
calculate effect 
size. 
 
Yes, some: P values 
and effect size 
calculated.  
Unconditional 
multilevel regression 
models with 
postintervention scores 
as DV.  
 
Yes, some: Used p 
values to determine 
statistical significance. 
However, due to small 
sample size and low 
statistical power, used 
p value of 0.1. sample 
size in statistical 
analysis not clear. 
Ratings were 
consistent with each 
other and had good 
internal consistency. 
Compared scores on 
SRM-SF in current 
study to scores from 
similar population in 
previous study- most 
participants = same 
level of moral 
reasoning in both.  
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Arthur, et al. 
(2017) 
Billig et al. 
(2008) 
Long (2014) Pike et al. 
(2015) 
Seider et al. 
(2013) 
Seroczynski et al. 
(2011) 
9. To what extent 
are the research 
design and methods 
employed able to 
rule out any other 
sources of 
error/bias which 
would lead to 
alternative 
explanations for the 
findings of the 
study? 
 
No: no 
comparison 
between groups 
or with control. 
Lots of reference 
to ethos. Low 
attrition rate on 
surveys. 
A little: Attempts to 
account for variance 
and pinpoint source 
of effect. Hard to 
control and replicate. 
Unclear what 
outcome measures 
are. Programme 
fidelity unclear. 
Survey scores 
decreased from pre- 
to post-test. 
A little: random 
allocation. Small 
control group- 
controls not 
matched. 
Programme 
fidelity? High 
attrition rate in both 
conditions (around 
33%). No analysis 
of sources of 
possible variance. 
A little: Clear 
programme of 
study. No control 
group but within- 
subjects 
comparison.   
Attrition: Year 9 
class did not 
return scores for 
Q’aire 2.  
A little: Attrition rate 
low and comparable 
between groups. Clear 
allocation to groups. 
Difference between 
groups is taken into 
account by stats. 
Attrition rate? 
Unreliable scales – 
some have low internal 
consistency; all rely on 
self-report. 
A little: Programme is 
replicable, though 
content of discussions 
not predictable. 
Assignment to engaged 
or disengaged group = 
arbitrary. High attrition 
rate- impact on data 
analysis not made 
clear. Reliance on self-
report but also used 
teacher report. 
10. How 
generalisable are 
the study results? 
 
 
Low: no 
comparison. Not 
clear which 
aspects of CE led 
to which 
outcomes in 
which schools. 
Ad-ICM mean 
scores varied 
according to age.  
  
Medium: Large 
sample size. Can’t 
replicate exact 
intervention. But high 
levels of statistical 
significance for some 
effects of service 
learning. Small effect 
sizes. 
Low: - short 
timescale, high 
attrition rate, no 
matching of 
controls. 
Programme 
fidelity? 
Medium: 
programme 
outcome 
measures clear. 
Relatively small 
sample size. 
Generalisability of 
outcome 
definitions and 
measures?  
Low/medium:– no 
fidelity measures for 
programmes. Effect of 
different 
teachers/styles not 
controlled for. No 
comparison with no CE 
intervention. 
Low: Scales & some 
course content 
replicable. Small 
sample size, population 
not representative, 
engaged and 
disengaged group = 
ad-hoc. Attrition rate 
and numbers in data 
analysis unclear. 
11. In light of the 
above, do the 
reviewers differ 
from the authors 
over the findings or 
conclusions of the 
study? 
 
 
N/A:  no causal 
links between 
intervention and 
outcome. Some 
qual. evidence of 
virtuous 
behaviour. Ad-
ICM linked to 
virtue reasoning. 
No: character 
outcomes = better 
for CE group. 
Acknowledges no 
clear causal 
connection between 
service learning and 
character 
development. 
No: the 
intervention did not 
make a difference 
to students’ 
Commitment to 
Ethical Goodness. 
No: increased 
virtue knowledge 
but does not 
necessarily mean 
virtuous 
behaviour. 
Yes: not enough 
evidence to conclude 
that disparate 
approaches to CE 
result in different 
character strengths. 
Yes: some sig diffs 
identified between 
engaged and 
disengaged group, but 
not possible to 
calculate effect size. 
‘Engaged’/control  = not 
appropriate 
comparison. 
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Study 
 
 
Arthur, et al. 
(2017) 
Billig et al. 
(2008) 
Long (2014) Pike et al. 
(2015) 
Seider et al. 
(2013) 
Seroczynski et al. 
(2011) 
12. Have sufficient 
attempts been made 
to justify the 
conclusions drawn 
from the findings, 
so that the 
conclusions are 
trustworthy? 
 
 
N/A Findings = 
description, not 
causal links. 
 
Low/Medium: need 
for clarity around 
conceptualisation of 
character 
development and 
how outcomes 
measure that.  
Low: –4 sessions 
may not be enough 
to impact on 
character. No 
further explanation 
offered. 
Medium: CE led 
to greater 
knowledge of 
virtues, not 
behaviour.  
Low: conclusions 
based on differences 
between the 3 groups 
but no control. 
Low:   identifies 
significant diff between 
groups on fidelity and 
charity but based on 
self-report and small 
sample size. Qual. 
findings suggest 
discussion provoked 
thoughts and 
motivations about 
virtue. 
13. Weight of 
evidence A 
Low 
 
Medium  Low  
 
Medium  Low/Medium  Low  
14. Weight of 
evidence B 
Low Medium Low Medium Low/medium Low 
15. Weight of 
evidence C 
Low/medium Low/medium Low Medium Low/medium Low/medium 
16. Weight of 
evidence D: Overall 
weight of evidence  
 
Low Low/Medium Low Medium Low/Medium Low 
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Appendix C Participant Information Sheet 
What’s the study about?  
• I’m researching how our character traits (e.g. honesty, fairness, 
respect) help us live a good and happy life.  
• I’m hoping to work with students to find out what you think 
about character and how different character traits can help you 
in your daily life.  
 
What will I be asked to do? 
• Part 1: Take part in an interview which should last 
for about 30 minutes. There will be questions about 
character traits and what they mean to you.  
• Part 2: Take part in a group discussion with 
between six and ten people. We will discuss some of the 
ideas that came up in the interviews. 
 
Agreeing to take part 
• It’s up to you whether you want to take part in the research.  
• You can change your mind at any time and stop taking part.  
• You will be given time at the start of the session to find out what we’re doing 
and choose whether you still want to take part.  
 
How will my data be used? 
• I will make audio recordings of the interview and the group session. I’ll 
use these to write a record of the discussion.  
• All the data will be anonymous so no-one would be able to tell it’s you in the 
report.  
• If you leave the study, your data will be deleted.  
 
How will data be stored? 
• The audio recordings will be saved securely then deleted 
when I’ve written my report.  
• Only my supervisors and I will have access to the data.  
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Appendix D Consent form 
 
Dear Parent/Carer, 
My name is Claire Briggs. I am a Trainee Educational Psychologist studying at 
Newcastle University. I am writing to you because I am hoping to recruit a group of 
students to take part in a research project taking place in school this term. The 
research is related to young people’s understanding of character traits such as 
honesty, respect and fairness and how they apply these traits to their everyday lives.  
The study would involve participation in an interview in which students would be 
asked to consider which character traits they think might be important to apply when 
faced with a fictional everyday scenario. They would also be asked to participate in a 
short group session in which we would discuss ideas that came up during the 
interview in more depth. 
Participation in the study is completely voluntary. All data collected will be 
anonymous so the responses of individual children would not be identifiable 
anywhere in the research report. Participants will have the right to withdraw from the 
study at any time.  
I am hoping to commence the research in the next few weeks. Students have been 
given a Participant Information Sheet detailing what the research will entail. I will hold 
a briefing session next week to give more details to students interested in taking part 
and to give them the opportunity to ask any questions they may have.  
If you are happy for your son/daughter to be involved in the research, please sign the 
parent section of the consent form and send it back to school with your son/daughter.  
If you have any questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact me – 
see details below.  
Kind Regards, 
Claire Briggs 
(Trainee Educational Psychologist) 
Newcastle University 
c.l.briggs@newcastle.ac.uk  
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Please read each statement carefully and tick to show you consent:  
 I have read the Participant Information Sheet. 
 I give my consent to participate in the interview and the focus group on 
character.  
 I understand that I am free to choose not to take part at any time, without 
giving a reason.  
 I understand that all information I give is anonymous and confidential.  
 I understand that the conversations in the interview and focus group will be 
audio-recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Only the researcher will 
hear the audio-recordings in full.  
 I understand that as part of the research we will produce a theory of how 
virtues can be applied to everyday life.  
 I understand that the interviews and focus groups will be analysed and 
presented in a research report as part of the researcher’s thesis, which may 
be put forward for publication in the future.  
 
Name of student: …………………………………………………  
Signature: ……………………………………………………………. 
 
Name of parent/guardian: ………………………………………………….. 
Signature of parent/guardian: …………………………………………….. 
 
Date: ……..……………………………………………  
 
If you have any questions about this research, please contact:  
Claire Briggs, email: c.l.briggs2@newcastle.ac.uk (Researcher)  
David Lumsdon, email: david.lumsdon@newcastle.ac.uk (Research Supervisor)  
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Appendix E Questionnaire  
The dilemmas young people most commonly face  
   
Read the situations below. Some of these situations may lead to difficult decisions 
for young people:   
  
1.  Drug and alcohol use   
2.  Unsupervised parties   
3.  Telling lies to receive something you shouldn’t (e.g. a higher grade, a cinema 
ticket)   
4.  Bullying/falling out with friends   
5.  Romantic relationships   
6.  Cheating in school work/exams   
7.  Being let down by adults/having to protect adults   
8.  Sticking up for a friend/ becoming a ‘tell-tale’   
9.  Trying to please demanding parents   
10.  Deciding what to do next after making a bad choice   
11.  Money   
12.  Social media use   
  
a. Write the numbers of the three situations you think are most likely to lead to 
difficult decisions for young people of your age:  
  
            _____          _____          _____  
  
b. Write the numbers of the three situations you think are least likely to lead to 
difficult decisions for young people of your age:  
  
            _____          _____          _____  
  
c. Are there any other situations (not on the list) in which you think young 
people often face difficult decisions. Please describe below:  
    
           ___________________________________________________________  
  
           ___________________________________________________________  
  
           ___________________________________________________________  
  
           ___________________________________________________________  
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Appendix F Origins of questionnaire scenarios  
(Taken from ‘Daily Dilemmas’ (Denison, 2018)) 
Scenario presented in 
questionnaire 
Which ‘Daily Dilemmas’ scenario came from 
1. Knowing how best to 
help a friend with a 
problem such as drug or 
alcohol misuse or an 
eating disorder. 
#1:  Jeff's best friend is getting into some pretty risky behaviors, including dangerous drugs. What can Jeff do to help his 
friend?  
#5:  Corey is drunk and stuck at a party thirty miles from home with nobody sober to drive him. He's not happy about any of 
his options. What should he do? 
#12:  Maria is sure that her good friend, Pam, has an eating disorder. Pam’s parents are in denial, and nobody but Maria 
and a few friends seem concerned. What should Maria do? 
#23: The incoming school president was caught breaking the school rules about alcohol. Should he be permitted to take 
office or should the student body hold a new election?  
#28: Lisa is at a party where her friend Sarah is vomiting and losing consciousness from alcohol consumption. Lisa wants 
to call 911. Her other friends want to try to deal with it themselves so they don't get in trouble. What to do?  
2. Parents not letting them 
do things that their 
friends are allowed to do. 
#2:  Jennifer knows her parents won't let her go to "the big party" if they find out the host's parents are out of town. Should 
she lie about it?  
 
3. Telling lies in order to 
receive something they 
shouldn’t (e.g. lying 
about their age to get 
into the cinema). 
#3:  What's the difference between cheating on a math test and lying about your age in order to save money on a movie 
ticket? 
#19: Archer is facing a thorny, but common, ethical dilemma: should he lie to his parents in order to receive a reward he's 
not entitled to, or tell them the truth and give up the reward? 
4. Being asked to do or say 
something against 
someone they are 
friends with. 
#15: Three of David's classmates have created an offensive website that attacks students and teachers. The principal 
wants to know who did it and David is the only one who knows. Should he lie to the principal or betray his classmates? 
#27:  Noah sees the same bully torment the same victim every day on the schoolyard, and nobody tells the teacher about 
it. Should Noah speak up and risk being labeled "tattletail," or should he ignore it and mind his own business?  
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5. Having a crush on the 
same person as their 
friend.  
#7:  Stephanie was supposed to tell a certain guy that her good friend had a crush on him. Instead, Stephanie ended up 
hooking up with the guy, herself. And to make matters worse, she lied to her friend about it . Now things are spinning out of 
control. What's she supposed to do? 
 
6. Cheating in school 
work/exams to get a 
better grade or because 
they have run out of time 
to finish a piece of work. 
#8:  A stressed out honor student has plagiarized a term paper and been turned over to the school's honor council. She is 
pleading with the council not to report her violation to the Ivy League university she is applying to. What should the council 
do? 
#13: You are stumped on an important math test and you have the perfect opportunity to cheat without getting caught. 
What do you do, and how do you explain your decision?  
#31: Georgia is a very good math student who does well on homework but falls apart under the stress of heavily weighted 
tests. Under these circumstances, would it be so terrible if she cheated just a little? (an exploration of situational ethics) 
7. Having to protect parents 
who are in some kind of 
trouble e.g. alcohol use, 
drug use, gambling. 
#9:  A high school sophomore faces a family crisis when his alcoholic mom relapses into drinking.  
#16: When Jay asks his mother how she would react if he tried drugs, he gets a stern warning. Then he discovers that 
she's been smoking pot. What is he supposed to do with that? 
#18: What do you do when your friend's dad comes to drive you home from a party, and you can tell that he's drunk? 
8. Dealing with a situation 
where they have been 
wronged by another 
person e.g. the person 
has told lies about them 
or has threatened them. 
#4:  Julia's best friend has turned against her and is now organizing the other girls to bully and isolate her. What can Julia 
do?  
#10:  An eighth grade girl starts receiving threatening notes in her locker and her backpack. 
#11:  A fifth grade boy is overcome with hurt and anger when a classmate spreads a lie about him.  
 
9. Trying to please 
demanding parents e.g. 
parents who have high 
expectations about 
school grades, behavior, 
or doing well at a 
sport/hobby. 
#22: Andrew is caught in a conflict between trying to please his overbearing father and doing what is best for himself. 
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10. Owning up to something 
they know they’re going 
to get into a lot of trouble 
for. 
#14: The star student makes a bad choice involving alcohol. Now she has to decide what to do about it without ruining her 
reputation or compromising her ethical principles. 
11. Trying to help a friend 
who has got into a bad 
relationship e.g. with an 
adult, or someone online 
who sounds suspicious. 
#20: Bethany has confided in Stacy that an adult neighbour has been touching her in ways that make her uncomfortable. 
Should Stacy keep Bethany's secret or risk their friendship by telling an adult? 
#21: Peter’s long-time close friend, Bridget, is wrapped up in an online relationship with some older guy on My Space, a 
social networking website. Peter senses danger, but Bridget resents his warnings and wants him to butt out. What can he 
do without risking their friendship?  
12. Knowing how to respond 
to an unkind word or post 
about someone on social 
media e.g. hurtful words 
or an embarrassing 
photo. 
#24:  Katy cringes every time she hears her friends use words like "retarded" or "gay" in a derogatory manner. Should she 
object when it happens, or should she let it pass so people won't think she's weird? 
#29: David has just joined a Facebook group and he discovers that somebody has posted an offensive and malicious photo 
of a girl from his class. David feels very uncomfortable about it. What, if anything, should he do?  
13. Knowing they have 
profited from someone 
else’s mistake/bad luck 
(e.g. taking money 
someone forgot to take 
from the ATM, or 
accepting a grade they 
know the teacher has 
miscalculated) 
#6:  Lea has been offered something she really wants. Unfortunately, it's terribly unfair to a lot of other people and she 
knows it. Should she allow herself to benefit from an unfair situation? 
#17: Kevin feels that his baseball coach has given him an unfair advantage over other members of the team. Should he do 
something about it, or just accept his good luck? 
#25:  Someone left money sticking out of an ATM machine and there's nobody in sight. Nobody but Ben, that is. If he takes 
it, does that make him a thief? What should he do? 
#26:  Erin's chemistry teacher made a huge mistake on Erin's final grade. A mistake that was very much in Erin's favor. 
Should Erin point out the mistake to her teacher, or accept her good fortune quietly and gratefully? 
#30: Brian has the perfect summer job, thanks to his dad. But when Brian finds out that some of his co-workers (including 
some with families to support) make significantly less money than he does even though they've been there much longer, he 
feels conflicted. What should he do? 
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Appendix G Questionnaire results 
Situation Most difficult 
total 
Least difficult 
total 
Difference Total times 
mentioned 
1. Drug and alcohol use 
 
11 6 5 17 
2. Unsupervised parties  
 
6 5 1 11 
3. Telling lies in order to receive something you 
shouldn’t (e.g. a higher grade, a cinema ticket)  
3 7 -4 10 
4. Bullying/falling out with friends  
 
9 1 8 10 
5. Romantic relationships  
 
7 8 -1 15 
6. Cheating in school work/exams   
 
2 8 -6 10 
7. Being let down by adults/having to protect adults  
 
2 4 -2 6 
8. Sticking up for a friend/ becoming a ‘tell-tale’  
 
1 5 -4 6 
9. Trying to please demanding parents  
 
2 2 0 4 
10. Deciding what to do next after making a bad 
choice  
 
3 4 -1 7 
11. Money  
 
5 2 3 7 
12. Social media use 
 
6 5 1 11 
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Qualitative Data 
12 people responsed to Question c: ‘Are there any other situations (not on the list) in which you think young people often face difficult 
decisions?’:  
• Peer pressure x 4  
• Exam pressure/pressure for good grades x 2 
• Young parents  
• Low self-esteem, communication and being a target either at home or at school 
• Opinions/fear of people talking about you 
• Appearance/opinions of other students in school 
• Friends doing something illegal/getting involved with illegal things  
 
Dilemma scenarios judged most common overall: 
• Bullying/ falling out with friends 
• Alcohol and drug use 
• Peer pressure
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Appendix H Examples of moral dilemmas 
The following are examples of the moral dilemma comic strips used in the interviews: 
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Appendix I Interview questions 
Open-ended questions Possible prompts 
1.Let’s read the stories together. I’d like you to choose one of the 
stories you feel comfortable to talk about. I’m going to ask you to think 
about what the character should do and why. I will ask you to explain 
your answer. 
 
Complete the decision map.  
How did you come to that decision? 
If you had to describe to the character how you made your decision, what 
would you say? 
What do you think the character had to take into account? 
2.What does it mean to you when I say ‘do the right thing’?  
 
How do you know whether or not you are doing the ‘right’ thing? Do you 
think you have a good understanding of what is ‘right’? 
Describe when you might and when you might not do the ‘right’ thing. 
3.Can you tell me about times when it might be easier for yourself or for 
other young people to feel you have done the ‘right’ thing? 
Can you tell me about times when it might be harder for yourself or for 
other young people to feel you have done the right thing? 
 
Are there any specific examples?  
Do you think you make decisions in the same way at home as you do at 
school? 
4. (Show list of virtues): Look at the list. Are there any words on the list 
which stand out to you/you think are particularly important? Why? Are 
there any of the words on the list that seem less important to you? 
Imagine a world without any of these things- what would it be like? 
 
What does this word mean to you? 
Can you give me an example…? 
Tell me a bit more about… 
What makes you think that… 
Can you explain why you think ___ is more important than _____? How 
do you know this is what it means? 
5.I was wondering how you know the things you have talked about 
today. How did you come to hold the ideas you do? What do you think 
you would need to keep developing that understanding? 
Can you give me an example..? 
Tell me more about… 
What makes you think that…? 
So you think….? 
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Appendix J Virtues discussed in interviews 
(Adapted from JCCV, 2017) 
 
 
Honesty 
 
 
Justice/Fairness 
 
 
Gratitude 
 
 
Responsibility 
 
 
Humility 
 
 
Compassion 
 
 
Integrity  
 
 
Respect 
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Appendix K Adapted interview questions 
Interview question   Possible prompts   
1. I’d like you to choose one of the stories you feel comfortable to talk 
about. What are the character’s options? Which one should they 
choose and why? What does their choice say about their character?   
 
Complete the decision map.    
How did you come to that decision?   
If you had to describe to the character how you made your decision, 
what would you say?   
What do you think the character had to take into account?   
2.What does it mean to you when I say ‘do the right thing’?  Can you 
tell me about times when it might be easier for yourself or for other 
young people to feel you have done the ‘right’ thing? Can you tell me 
about times when it might be harder for yourself or for other young 
people to feel you have done the right thing?  
 
How do you know whether or not you are doing the ‘right’ thing?    
Do you think you have a good understanding of what is ‘right’?   
Describe when you might and when you might not do the ‘right’ 
thing.   
Do you think you make decisions in the same way at home as you do 
at school?   
3.Do you consider yourself to be a good person? What does this 
mean to you?  
 
Are there any specific examples?  
Are people good all the time?  
What makes a good person? 
4. Look at the list. What would you call all these? Are there any words 
on the list which stand out to you/you think are particularly important? 
Why?   
Are there any of the words on the list that seem less important to 
you?   
Imagine a world without any of these things- what would it be like?   
What does this word mean to you? How do you know this is what it 
means? Can you give me an example…?  Tell me a bit more 
about…      
What makes you think that…   
Can you explain why you think ___ is more important than _____? 
Think of a time you might have to choose between two or more of 
these...?  
5.(read Heinz Dilemma, Kohlberg (1969)) What are Heinz’s options? 
What should he do? What might this say about his character?  
Do you think everyone would do the same in this situation?  
6.I was wondering how you know the things you have talked about 
today. How did you come to hold the ideas you do? What do you 
think you would need to keep developing that understanding?   
 
Can you give me an example..?   
Tell me more about how you learn about these things in school...  
What makes you think that…?   
So you think….?   
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Appendix L Sample transcript 
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Appendix M Early Model
Emotions 
Time 
 
Instinct 
Experience 
Beliefs/values 
Relationships 
Social support 
Weighing best 
consequences for 
self and others 
Emotional effect  
Upholding own  
beliefs and values 
Helping and caring 
for others 
Upholding law  Avoiding harm, loss and 
punishment 
Upholding principles 
valued by society 
Relationships 
Emerging core process in moral 
decision-making Consequences weighed in moral 
decision-making 
Situational factors influencing 
how young people weigh 
consequences for self and 
others. 
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Appendix N Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you for taking part! 
The aim of the research was to learn more about what character and virtues mean to 
you and how they apply to situations you might come across in your daily life.   
Research into Character Education states: 
• Character can be taught- we can learn new virtues. 
• Our character and virtues can help us in making decisions in 
our daily lives. 
• Sometimes we may have to choose between two or more 
virtues when faced with a dilemma.  
• Young people are thought to be in the process of developing 
their virtues and so may approach situations differently to adults. 
In our research: 
• You talked about virtues and their impact on your life.  
• As a group we thought about….  
• The following seemed to be important to you when thinking 
about character and virtues…. 
 
Don’t forget: 
• Once transcribed the audio recordings will be deleted. 
• All data will be anonymous. 
• The report may be published in the future.  
• You can still choose to leave the study and your personal data will be deleted.  
• If you are interested in finding out more about the results, I am happy to share. 
 
Any questions, please contact: 
• Claire Briggs, email: c.l.briggs2@newcastle.ac.uk  (Researcher) 
• David Lumsdon, email: david.lumsdon@newcastle.ac.uk (Research 
supervisor) 
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Appendix O Data analysis procedure example 
The table below provides a broad summary of data analysis, with examples of codes and extracts of memos at different stages of the process. 
Step in data analysis process Commentary 
Original Grounded Theory question: How do young people apply character and virtues to their 
daily lives? 
 
I started with a broad overarching 
question. As the data collection and 
analysis process went on, I adapted the 
question as patterns and ideas began to 
emerge from the data. 
12 early initial codes which seemed particularly significant: 
• Basing decisions on consequences 
• Being honest is very important 
• Being taught about the right thing 
• Being there for friends 
• Following the rules 
• Interpreting the right thing in different ways 
• Keep remembering and thinking about the right thing 
• Learning the right thing through experience 
• Not hurting others 
• Others influencing thoughts and actions 
• Telling somebody 
• Thinking about other 
In initial coding, I had stayed action-
focused and as close to the data as 
possible. I had 512 codes prior to 
beginning the process of focused coding. 
It was possible to reduce the number of 
codes quickly by merging codes where 
ideas were duplicated but wording 
differed.  
 
I wrote short, descriptive memos for each 
of these 12 early initial codes which 
seemed particularly significant. 
 
Example of memo based on initial code. 
 
25.10.18. MEMO: Not hurting others 
 
Not hurting people seemed to be a priority for most participants. Almost everybody mentioned the 
importance of thinking about others. (Could link to: ‘upholding what’s morally right’, thinking 
about others’ and ‘being there for friends’). Nine people spoke explicitly about the importance of 
not hurting others. Jesse said it’s, “just not good” to hurt the feelings of others (Jesse) and Ellis 
remarked “Don’t do anything that you know is gonna cause something, for somebody to be horrible 
or for something bad to happen”. Ellis seemed to be speaking here about the importance of having 
good intentions and setting out to think of the effects our actions have on others. She 
Not hurting others’ was an initial code 
which I retained as a focused code. It 
was subsequently merged into ‘basing 
decisions on consequences’, which went 
on to become part of the ‘weighing 
competing priorities’ category, which in 
turn became the ‘weigh consequences 
against competing personal and social 
priorities’ in the final analysis. 
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acknowledged it is not always easy to anticipate all the possible consequences of our actions and 
therefore there is a chance that we might inadvertently hurt someone else. However, we should 
always start by trying not to hurt others. Some things were believed to be very obviously wrong and 
very obviously going to have a negative effect on another person. As Bob said, "you know that if 
they’re going to start bullying and tormenting, you know it’ll hurt that person and it’ll make them 
upset”.  
 
I wonder if ‘not hurting people’ might take different forms. Some of the quotes seem to relate to not 
actively doing something you know will hurt someone else, while some relate more to the effects of 
inaction i.e. standing by and doing nothing when another person is being harmed or hurt: 
 
No active harm to others 
Some participants described ways in which they ensured their actions did not harm others, for 
example, not being mean to people you don’t like (Rory), not bullying others (Bob) and making a 
decision not to tell people things in order to spare their feelings (Ash) – this seems to depend on the 
future stakes i.e. if all you will do is hurt their feelings, you might not tell them but if you can spare 
them worse consequences in the future, you would tell (interesting: immediacy of consequences – 
how far into the future should we look?). Jordan talked about owning up to what you’ve done – 
perhaps in order to spare others from getting into trouble? (Does this fit here, or would it be 
better coded with ‘taking responsibility’?). 
 
No passive harm to others 
Passive harm can come to others if we are not sufficiently aware of the people around us. It was 
judged important to remember to put oneself in another person’s shoes e.g. druggist may have 
done the same as Heinz (Jordan). Alex talked about the importance of remembering the other 
person. Riley said people don’t always realise how they’ve made someone else feel e.g. Julia’s 
tormentors in dilemma scenario. Similarly, Rory spoke about the importance of recognising the 
consequences of our actions, which can sometimes be put to one side if we get too caught up in 
our own emotions. Ash said something similar to this – she spoke about not being selfish. Bob said 
something similar relating to getting caught up in the moment: “I had the feeling they were bad…but 
when you’re in the moment…” (interesting: something about immediacy of a situation? 
Proximity to a situation?).   
 
Another important element to passive harm comes when young people can see “injustice 
happening” (Rory) but may not act – possibly because of consequences to self? (What holds 
Example quotes for initial code: ‘not 
hurting others’  
 
<Files\\Interview transcript 1 Jesse Y8> - § 2 
references coded  [0.92% Coverage] 
Reference 1 - 0.35% Coverage 
not tell the girl cos then she’ll be really upset 
 
Reference 2 - 0.57% Coverage 
don’t hurt people. I think when you hurt their 
feelings and it’s just not good. 
<Files\\Interview transcript 10 Charlie Y10> - 
§ 1 reference coded  [1.00% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.00% Coverage 
 like that, yeah. 
Erm, yeah, maybe just tell her what she could 
improve on a bit more. But I wouldn’t tell her 
that she’s terrible cos that can knock your 
confidence I guess, especially when you 
think that you’re alright. 
<Files\\Interview transcript 11 Ellis Y10> - § 4 
references coded  [4.38% Coverage] 
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people back?). Bob gave bullying as an example: “You should not stand by and watch somebody 
getting bullied without trying to do something about it” (Bob). As well as bullying, Ash pointed out 
people may not respect others if they are jealous of them (is disrespect a form of passive 
harm…or should this be coded elsewhere…?).  
 
Queries/anomalies 
Doing the right thing can sometimes hurt others – I don’t know if this counts as active or passive 
harm – e.g. Rory’s story about having to tell an adult about something a friend had done. She 
believed she was acting in the friend’s best interests.  
Giving others a chance to confess – again, don’t know whether this constitutes active or passive 
harm. 
 
Codes from Nvivo on 30/10/18: What does character and virtue mean to young people and how do 
they apply it to their lives? 
 
Arriving at a judgment about the best thing to do 
 Deterrents to perceived right action 
avoiding harm, loss or trouble 
bad decisions threatening health 
being in the situation makes it harder to do the right thing 
    having to make a choice in the moment 
    not anticipating all consequences in the moment 
    not thinking in the moment 
    peers influencing in moment 
 instinct kicks in 
 powerful emotions driving decisions 
 Degrees of culpability 
 Getting caught up in own feelings 
 Not hurting people 
 Peer pressure making right thing harder to do 
    everybody knowing about what’s happened 
    group disagreeing with you 
    portraying a certain image 
 Personal problems making good harder 
 Strength of relationships 
 Telling truth could have negative consequences 
 
 Facilitators of perceived right action 
avoiding trouble 
I adapted the original research question 
to include consideration of what 
character and virtue mean to young 
people.  
 
Following further focused coding, the 
most salient codes changed from those 
which were standing out after the first 
stage of focusing some of the initial 
codes. Similar codes were grouped at 
the same node using the Nvivo12 
software. Some codes started to emerge 
as overarching categories and sub-
categories, as shown in the codes 
opposite. Bold codes are those that were 
emerging as possible categories, with 
associated focused codes and initial 
codes displayed below them.  
 
The initial code ‘avoiding harm’ was 
combined with other initial codes to form 
the focused code ‘avoiding harm, loss or 
trouble’. This was initially categorised 
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eliciting positive feelings for self and other 
rewarded for responsible behaviour 
seeking support when needed 
    having optinion reinforced by others 
    informing teacher there has been an issue 
    not feeling able to tell 
standing by who you are and what you believe 
    being consistent in your beliefs and actions 
    being willing to say what you think 
    believing in self 
    making own decision (not swayed by others) 
    minding your own business 
    selecting friends carefully 
think before you act and speak 
 
 Possible hidden consequences 
positive side-effects of upholding right action 
 
 Weighing competing priorities 
considering options and their outcomes 
    choosing best outcome for majority 
        balancing needs of self and other 
             compromising so both profit 
             giving what you want to get back 
             putting others before self 
             putting self before others 
    choosing between two negative outcomes 
         balancing needs of individual against rules 
decisions contingent on setting 
differing moral consciences between people 
    differing views on relative importance of gratitude 
    strength of relationship 
 
Learning about the right thing 
 Learning from others 
consulting trusted people around you 
    selecting friends carefully 
judging if someone’s a good person 
learning from examples 
     changing influences as we get older 
     negative influences showing wrong thing 
     showing meaning by good influences 
  the right thing is told to us 
with ‘deterrents to perceived right action’, 
although this changed in subsequent 
stages of data analysis. 
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 Learning through our own experience 
first-hand experience helping us learn 
    learning from mistakes 
reflecting on experiences 
 
 Some things are innate 
 
Upholding widely-held principles 
 Addressing wrongdoing 
making amends 
reflecting after the event 
taking responsibility for wrongdoing 
 Being honest is very important 
honesty is most important 
honesty is the right thing 
honest and respect most important 
honesty maintaining trust in relationships 
telling truth leads to fewer problems 
    telling now avoiding worse in future 
    consequences of lying 
 Being there for others 
being there for friends 
    choosing between friendship and right action 
    not going against a friend 
    not letting friends get away with bad decisions 
    weighing up whether to take the blame for a friend 
    considering the worth of a friendship 
equal worth as human beings 
     asymmetric relationship with respect 
     being fair to others 
        not standing by and watching suffering 
being kind 
responding to needs of others 
wanting to help 
 Following law or rules is best 
law not always sitting well 
 Taking responsibility 
 
Emerging categories 1.12.18. 
• Basing decisions on consequences 
• Weighing competing priorities 
Through a process of constant 
comparison and analytic memo-writing 
about focused codes and emerging 
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• Keep remembering and thinking about the right thing 
• Learning about the right thing 
• Upholding what’s morally right 
 
categories, these categories began to 
emerge from the data. ‘Arriving at a 
judgment about what to do’ was replaced 
with ‘basing decisions on consequences’ 
and ‘weighing competing priorities’. The 
intention in splitting the category was to 
highlight that weighing needs of self and 
other seemed to be important and that 
through this process participants were 
then able to base decisions on 
consequences. Weighing competing 
priorities seemed to form a key part of 
the decision-making process. (see below 
for example memo). 
1.12.2018. MEMO Basing decisions on consequences 
(In writing the memo, I used some of Corbin and Strauss’ (1990) axial coding questions, along with some of Charmaz’s (2006) key questions to consider 
when analysing the data.) 
 
What is the process? 
Everybody in the course of outlining their decisions made some reference to the consequences of their decisions. 
 
How can it be defined? 
Many spoke about the importance of thinking about the consequences of different courses of action before deciding what to do. Some 
participants talked about thinking about the consequences for themselves and for others (Bob, Jesse and Jordan). They did not say explicitly 
how they would weigh these up and none of the other participants spoke about it explicitly but I think there is some evidence from their 
responses of how they might do it. There was more said about the consequences for self than for others… 
 
Self 
The participants spoke about a number of different consequences which might potentially affect them, including:- 
− “getting into trouble” (Bob, Jesse and Ash- don’t want to “throw themselves under the bus”). The idea of getting into trouble seemed to 
be particularly important to Jesse who mentioned it three times. She related it to truth- you will get in trouble if you hide the truth. 
− Being punished for breaking the rules (is this the same as getting into trouble?) – Elena, Bob (mentioned in the scenario about Maya 
and James and the risk they might get excluded). 
− Feeling guilty for lying (Elena and Bob) 
− Fear of being hurt by e.g. bullies (Sky and Jordan) 
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− Breaking the law (a few people mentioned the importance of following the law- links to Following the rules). Jordan explicitly 
mentioned the possibility of going to prison if you break the law. Elena talked about how important it is not to do anything illegal. Is 
breaking the law the deterrent or is the consequence of breaking the law the deterrent? To follow up… Alex acknowledged that 
the law wasn’t always right but that it’s better to go with it because the consequences of not following the law are “not too great really”. 
This is interesting because it suggests that the law in itself may not be the determining factor but rather the consequences of breaking it 
 suggests the possibility that if the consequences of breaking the law were not too severe, Alex thinks young people might 
be happy to do so…?  
− Avoiding teacher involvement. Riley spoke lots about trying to sort things out for yourself before getting a teacher involved, although 
the consequences may relate more to how it’s perceived if you get a teacher involved than to the actual involvement of the 
teacher (?) 
− Poor health – Jesse identified the negative impact some activities can have on YP’s health: smoking and drinking. Jordan also spoke 
about how drinking might affect YP. Again, perhaps I haven’t drilled down to the root concern here: The fact that drinking can 
affect you is not necessarily bad- what are the effects we should hope to avoid?? 
− One action leading to further problems. The most talked-about example of this was lies: Sky, Ash and Bob all alluded to the idea of 
telling one lie having a snowball effect where you have to tell more and more lies to cover up the initial lie. A knock-on effect of lying is 
that it leads to lack of trust (Riley) and people stop believing what you say (Rory). 
− Receiving rewards e.g. being allowed to do something again in the future (Riley). Riley gave the example of being responsible and 
looking after her cousins meaning that she was allowed/asked to do it again (her virtue was rewarded). 
 
Other 
There were not as many comments under this code pertaining to the effect of our actions on others. However, I think this might be because I 
have coded these ideas at a different location: ‘Thinking of others’. There’s more around treating others well under ‘thinking of others’ 
 (Consequences are implied but not explicit in this category). ‘Being there for friends’ could also form a strong part of the link between 
thinking of the consequences for self and others. Perhaps I need to explore possibility of rearranging/merging these categories…? 
− Protecting others: Standing up against bullies (Rory). Bob talked about stepping in to prevent people from being bullied because she 
could see that the person was really upset and the bully was going to make things worse.  
Sometimes our actions might not seem to be in the other person’s best interests in the short-term. For example, Rory talks about a 
decision she made that her friend didn’t agree with at the time. She was able to explain the decision to the friend and help her to 
understand that although the short-term consequences were not good for her, she had done it to protect her in the long-run. Perhaps 
part of what it means to be a good friend is therefore taking unpopular decisions and being prepared to stand by these in the best 
interests of the other person…How do they know they’re acting in the other person’s best interests? 
− For own gain – sometimes people appear to be being kind to another person but they are actually doing this for their own gain (Rory). “I 
think cos sometimes it shouldn’t be used just for your own gain cos some people will be kind to others just to show- and when no-one’s 
there, they just like stop doing it.” 
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To consider: We judge what to do based on consequences. How do we judge which consequences are right and which are wrong? 
It’s not straightforward…maybe virtues come in here…so maybe we need to think about the consequences and then think about 
whether these consequences uphold virtue…? In which case, virtue is more important/is different to cognition and affect…?  
 
Actions and interactions (whom and how?) (Corbin & Strauss, 1990)/ How does this process develop? (Charmaz, 2006) 
 
Alex spoke about deciding what would be the best thing to do in general. His and others’ responses implied a weighing up of different courses 
of action and their possible outcomes. Jordan also spoke about trying to determine what is the “best” thing to do in a given situation. Bob’s 
response to one of the dilemmas posed also indicated an awareness of the importance of thinking about the consequences from different 
perspectives. She recognised that the characters could either be excluded themselves or potentially risk losing a friend – so there would be 
cons to either decision. Alex talked about the pros and cons of either decision too and about how he might use the worth of the friendship to 
determine what the best course of action would be…so it wasn’t strictly about consequences for him- he combined objective consequences 
with a more subjective feeling… “base the decisions off that like if it’s worth it really”. How do we determine whether it’s worth doing 
something? 
 
A few people spoke about how having more knowledge or experience might help them in their decision-making (Links to ‘Keep remembering 
and thinking about the right thing’ and ‘Learning through experience’). Sky, for example, said you’re more likely to do the right thing if you 
know more because “you’ll know like the consequences if you do the wrong thing”. So experience helps us know what to expect and prepares 
us for future decisions. Alex also talked about how experience helped to prepare people for doing the right thing. His response seemed to 
incorporate emotion…he thought that it would be easier for a person to take the blame for someone else if they were used to being in trouble 
and that it might be quite a difficult decision for someone who was not used to being in trouble (Should emotion be in a category of it’s own, 
or does it enter into all categories?).  
 
Sometimes young people spoke about following instructions they had been given from elders, (perhaps this is distinct from applying their 
own knowledge and experience?): Jesse talks about teachers always saying that students will be “in a lot less trouble” if they just tell the 
truth. This is almost received wisdom…seems like something commonly said by teachers to students… 
 
How does the research participant act while involved in this process? 
Participants spoke about upholding rules; some of them talked about weighing up the pros and cons of different outcomes; some of them recall 
past experiences; some of them act according to their instinct and think if you have to think too much about it then it probably means you’re 
doing the wrong thing…should the right thing to do always be immediately obvious to us? How can we incorporate virtue into 
decisions when acting on instinct? 
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When, why and how does the process change? 
It is easier to do the right thing in situations where the right thing is more obvious (Alex). It’s also easier to do the right thing if it is something 
you hold as an absolute. For example, Bob told me she cannot stand bullying and therefore does not need to think about what to do when she 
sees it happening. She will always step in and help the person being bullied because she knows it’s the right thing to do: “I didn’t even think 
what was gonna happen, I just said “look, stop. It’s not the right thing to do.” The importance of ‘sticking up for others’ and helping those who 
are being bullied was also mentioned by other participants. How do we know bullying is wrong? What is bullying? What is it about 
bullying that people find so unconscionable?  
 
It’s not always a case of weighing what will happen as an immediate result of the situation. Thinking about the ongoing consequences of our 
actions at different future points in time could tip the balance in a different direction. Jordan spoke about this idea of weighing consequences in 
the here and now against future consequences. She pointed out it might be okay to lie in some situations in “preventing a bigger situation from 
happening”. Similarly, Sky spoke about it being tempting to do the wrong thing if you think you might be able to get away with it in the short 
term. However, she concluded that people are always likely to get found out in the end. This suggests young people don’t just weigh 
consequences at one point in time- they consider the long-term as well as the short-term implications of their decisions. (Links to anticipating 
hidden consequences…?). Some responses suggested young people were not always able to anticipate all future consequences clearly in 
the heat of the moment. Riley said sometimes she knows after she’s done something that it was the wrong thing to do. This suggests young 
people might not always know or think about what was the right thing to do before they do it…this could also fit with some of participants’ 
comments about instinct…are they acting out of instinct? Impulse? Social influence? What is the difference?  
 
?? Is it always possible to judge the virtue/good of an action on the basis of its consequences? Sometimes a person might do the 
right thing and still get into trouble…? Therefore appealing to consequences alone cannot tell us if their action was right or wrong. 
Important – suggests limitations of consequentialist notions of morality…? 
 
What happens as a result? (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) 
 
Participants seemed to be weighing the consequences for self and others in order to: avoid harm (through getting self or others into trouble, 
through causing emotional distress, or through causing harm or loss to self or other). It was particularly important to avoid negative 
consequences and promote positive consequences for those participants felt close to – links to maintaining relationships? It also seemed 
important to participants to follow the rules (including the law) and to do what they believe to be morally right. 
 
20/12/18 – Theoretical coding. Through mapping the relationships between emerging categories and continuing to write memos, ‘weighing 
competing priorities’ emerged as the dominant process in moral decision-making. This was linked to ‘Basing decisions on consequences’ and 
the category which emerged was called ‘Weighing best consequences for self and others’. Of the other emerging categories, I merged ‘learning 
about the right thing’ and ‘keep remembering and thinking about the right thing’ to form the sub- category ‘having relevant experience’. 
‘Upholding what’s morally right’ also became a subcategory within ‘weighing best consequences for self and others’. The other focused codes 
106 
 
all seemed to fall under this weighing process in that they were conceptualised as situational factors which might interact with one-another and 
influence the weight the individual gave to different consequences. The following sub-categories emerged within ‘weighing best consequences 
for self and others’: 
 
• Helping and caring for others 
• Emotional effect  
• Relationships 
• Upholding the law 
• Upholding one’s own beliefs and values 
• Upholding principles valued by society 
• Avoiding harm and loss 
____________________________________ 
 
• Experience 
• Time 
• Social support 
• Instinct  
 
Through theoretical coding, the factors were initially split into two groups as shown above; the first group was the consequences young people 
seemed to be weighing in their moral decisions and the second group was the factors that seemed to influence the way in which they weighed 
these consequences. These factors featured in the model of the emerging theory I took back to participants during the focus groups (See 
Appendix N). 
Sharing the model  
 
I took the model back to participants for feedback. They agreed most of the factors presented in the model were relevant to them and were 
consequences that might influence their moral decision-making, except ‘Upholding the law’. They did not think the law was directly relevant to 
them at their age. They also highlighted the interactions they thought took place between all the different factors in the model and that a 
decision could be influenced by different combinations of factors depending on the situation. 
The model did not offer an adequate way of mapping the influence of each of the factors or the interactions between them. Participants 
highlighted that any element of the model could interact with any other, depending on the situation. I concluded it is not possible to represent 
specific personal and situational factors relevant to moral decision-making diagrammatically. I went back to the process of theoretical coding 
and began to reconsider the links between each of my categories.  
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Theoretical coding and linking to existing literature 
(My theoretical memos were merged to generate the final analysis, as seen in Section 3.3)  
 
Reconsidering the links between each of the sub-categories under ‘weighing the best consequences for self and others’, I realised this did not 
fully explain the process of moral decision-making. In the focus groups, participants had spoken about acting on instinct at times or not wanting 
or needing to think about all the possible consequences of their actions. Therefore, this category did not fully express all possible processes. In 
the interviews, participants had spoken about the idea that they sometimes act on impulse. The Year 8 focus group spoke about the idea that 
often adults are better at stopping and thinking about all the consequences than young people are because they have more experience. When I 
began my literature search, I started to think about the idea of having the experience needed to make certain decisions and also about whether 
this experience is necessarily called upon in different situations. Social cognitive dual processing theory reinforced the idea of the importance of 
experience in moral decision-making. Moral dilemmas might activate an intuitive response if the young people has a well-established virtue 
schema that can provide an automatic response in a similar situation. Alternatively, a moral dilemma might require a deliberative response in 
less familiar situations. This might lead to more conscious processing of a wider range of factors which may influence the situation. Having had 
experience of similar situations in the past may help the young person to anticipate possible consequences in terms of, for example, harm, loss, 
relationships with others, or emotions. Existing experience therefore plays a key role in our response to moral dilemmas. ‘Having relevant 
experience’ seemed equally as important as ‘weighing the best consequences for self and other’ because our experience permeates through 
everything we do. Therefore, ‘activating relevant beliefs and understandings of the good’ became a second substantive category alongside 
‘weighing best consequences for self and others’.  
 
I then adapted ‘weighing best consequences for self and others’ because it did not fully express the interactions that were at play between the 
variety of possible personal and situational factors at play. I also realised that it was not possible to name all the personal and situational factors 
that could have an influence on moral decision-making, or to develop a heuristic or model that could adequately express how they interact. I 
decided the category therefore needed to be broader and to express the constant interaction between a range of personal and situational 
factors. Again, the literature supported this category, with theories of ethical expertise and practical wisdom highlighting the importance of being 
sensitive to relevant situational factors and trying to find a way to integrate virtues to promote the best possible outcomes for self and others 
within the bounds of the particular situation. 
 
This led me to change my research question a final time to: How do young people’s personal understandings of the good and salient situational 
factors interact with one-another in their moral decision-making? 
 
Final substantive categories and sub-categories following integrating relevant literature with emerging grounded theory: 
 
Substantive theoretical code: activating relevant beliefs and understandings of the good (corresponds to section 3.3.2) 
negative influences showing wrong thing 
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being shown meaning by good influences 
    first-hand experience helping us learn 
    reflecting on relevant experiences  
    upholding one’s beliefs 
 
Substantive theoretical code: weighing consequences against competing personal and social priorities (corresponds to 
section 3.3.3) 
effect of emotions 
level of social support 
maintaining important relationships 
proximity to the situation 
producing the most satisfactory overall outcome 
 
 
 
 
